Reference health

Myopic Agency

https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx034
CiteStamped reference-health badge
14/14 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-26

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 14 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.x
Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669806.001.0001
Executive Remuneration and Employee Performance-Related Pay
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01768.x
Dynamic CEO Compensation
resolves10.1006/jeth.1999.2619
A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn037
Optimal Executive Compensation when Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion
resolves10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-S
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.017
Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01688.x
Motivating Innovation
resolves10.1111/j.1468-036X.2013.12024.x
Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: a Case Study in Unintended Consequences
resolves10.2307/1912747
Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
resolves10.2307/1911017
Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
resolves10.1086/261524
Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
resolves10.2307/2937861
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedMathematical Economics: Twenty Papers by Gerard Debreu
no DOI — not checkedThe Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System
no DOI — not checked“Delegated Investment in a Dynamic Agency Model”
no DOI — not checked“Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives”,
no DOI — not checked“Moral Hazard and Long-Run Incentives”
no DOI — not checked“UBS Leads Way with Bonuses Shake-up”,
no DOI — not checked“Contracting Timely Delivery with Hard to Verify Quality”
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-07-26 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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