Reference health

Rating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower?

https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfp025
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26/26 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

18 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 26 checked references that resolve
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The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00057
The Declining Credit Quality of U.S. Corporate Debt: Myth or Reality?
resolves10.2307/2951491
Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn067
On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00045-3
Speed of issuance and the adequacy of disclosure in the 144A high-yield debt market
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00185-5
Market evidence on the opaqueness of banking firms’ assets
resolves10.1016/S1042-9573(03)00040-8
A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank capital rules
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04407.x
The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices
resolves10.2307/1992111
Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit
resolves10.1023/B:RAST.0000013627.90884.b7
Assessing the Probability of Bankruptcy
resolves10.1353/mcb.2006.0072
Stock Market Reaction to Financial Statement Certification by Bank Holding Company CEOs
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(86)90006-1
The effect of bond rating changes on common stock prices
resolves10.1007/s10693-006-0420-y
Testing for Opaqueness in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Bond Credit Ratings
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.015
Avoiding the rating bounce: why rating agencies are slow to react to new information
resolves10.1111/j.1755-053X.2007.tb00080.x
Asset Opaqueness and Split Bond Ratings
resolves10.1257/00028280260344506
Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511610240.004
Global Games: Theory and Applications
resolves10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00239-8
Coordination risk and the price of debt
resolves10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00253-9
Are unsolicited credit ratings biased downward?
resolves10.1111/j.0306-686X.2005.00646.x
Are Unsolicited Credit Ratings Lower? International Evidence From Bank Ratings
resolves10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00206.x
Do Solicitations Matter in Bank Credit Ratings? Results from a Study of 72 Countries
resolves10.2307/2297431
Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation
resolves10.2307/1907413
Safety First and the Holding of Assets
resolves10.2139/ssrn.802085
Is There a Difference between Solicited and Unsolicited Bank Ratings and, If so, Why?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00650.x
Default Risk in Equity Returns
resolves10.1111/j.0006-341X.2000.00645.x
A Note on Robust Variance Estimation for Cluster‐Correlated Data
The 18 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe economic function of credit rating agencies—What does the watchlist tell us?
no DOI — not checkedModelling the role of credit rating agencies—Do they spark off a virtous circle?
no DOI — not checkedAnalyzing the tradeoff between ratings accuracy and stability
no DOI — not checkedTesting conflicts of interest at bond rating agencies with market anticipation: evidence that reputation incentives dominate
no DOI — not checkedUnsolicited ratings and Basel II
no DOI — not checkedWhy do firms pay for bond ratings when they can get them for free?
no DOI — not checkedAre banks opaque?
no DOI — not checkedReport on the activities of credit rating agencies IOSCO
no DOI — not checkedCharacteristics and appraisal of major rating companies, JCIF
no DOI — not checkedPrice discovery in opaque markets
no DOI — not checkedCorporate governance, regulation, and bank risk taking
no DOI — not checkedOn the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates
no DOI — not checkedThe opacity of insurance companies
no DOI — not checkedEstimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing approaches
no DOI — not checkedRegulatory issues and economic principles, SEC
no DOI — not checkedSummary report of issues identified in the commission staff's examinations of selected credit rating agencies, SEC
no DOI — not checkedAnnual 2005 global corporate default study and rating transitions
no DOI — not checkedCorporate ratings criteria
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. If Crossref’s record marks the work itself retracted, withdrawn, or removed, the badge says so instead of showing clean. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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