At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in
Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the
registry record that put it there.
The 58 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1108/CG-06-2018-0196Does board independence moderate the relationship between environmental disclosure quality and performance? Evidence from static and dynamic panel data
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn036Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century American Railroads
resolves10.2307/1885568Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment
resolves10.2139/ssrn.3945686How Do Independent Directors View Generalist vs. Specialist CEOS? Evidence from an Exogenous Regulatory Shock
resolves10.1111/fire.12244How do independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Evidence from a quasi‐natural experiment
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.12043How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short‐Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency
resolves10.1111/fima.12066Tradeoffs between Internal and External Governance: Evidence from Exogenous Regulatory Shocks
resolves10.1111/irfi.12144How do Independent Directors Influence Corporate Risk‐Taking? Evidence from a Quasi‐Natural Experiment
resolves10.1177/0312896217712334Does board independence substitute for external audit quality? Evidence from an exogenous regulatory shock
resolves10.1108/CG-04-2020-0156Impact of corporate governance compliance and board attributes on operating liquidity in pre- and post-corporate governance reforms
resolves10.1108/CG-02-2014-0022The impact of ownership and board structure on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting in the Turkish banking industry
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhv076The Asset Redeployability Channel: How Uncertainty Affects Corporate Investment
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn084The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors
resolves10.1002/smj.657Exploring the debate on short‐termism: a theoretical and empirical analysis
resolves10.1108/CG-03-2012-0015Is director independence merely a box ticking exercise? A study of independence determinations in Irish listed companies
resolves10.1016/j.frl.2021.102212Does the market for corporate control impede or promote corporate innovation efficiency? Evidence from research quotient
resolves10.1108/CG-03-2020-0086Exploring how independent directors view CSR inequality using a quasi-natural experiment
resolves10.1108/CG-12-2018-0365Corporate governance and corporate internet reporting in sub-Saharan Africa:the case of Kenya and Tanzania
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior
no DOI — not checkedThe earnings game. Everyone plays, nobody wins
no DOI — not checkedThe Sarbanes–Oxley act and firms’ going-private decisions
no DOI — not checkedThe economic implications of corporate financial reporting
no DOI — not checkedShort-Term America: The Causes and Cures of Our Business Myopia
no DOI — not checkedGoing-private decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002: a cross-country analysis
no DOI — not checkedWhy do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations
no DOI — not checkedBoard involvement in corporate sustainability reporting: evidence from Sri Lanka, corporate governance
no DOI — not checkedHow do independent directors view powerful executive risk-taking incentives? A quasi-natural experiment
no DOI — not checkedDoes the market for corporate control influence executive risk-taking incentives? Evidence from takeover vulnerability
no DOI — not checkedCapital Choices: The Causes and Cures of Business Myopia
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