Reference health

Does board independence influence asset redeployability? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-06-2021-0218
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1 of 59 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-02

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

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Capital Market Pressure, Disclosure Frequency-Induced Earnings/Cash Flow Conflict, and Managerial Myopia (Retracted)
The 58 checked references that resolve
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Optimal Investment with Costly Reversibility
resolves10.1108/CG-06-2018-0196
Does board independence moderate the relationship between environmental disclosure quality and performance? Evidence from static and dynamic panel data
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.08.002
Liquidity mergers
resolves10.1108/CG-08-2015-0110
Earnings quality and audit attributes in high concentrated ownership market
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04735.x
Do Short‐Term Objectives Lead to Under‐ or Overinvestment in Long‐Term Projects?
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn036
Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century American Railroads
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.03.003
Collateral pricing☆
resolves10.2307/1885568
Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.10.004
The collateral channel under imperfect debt enforcement
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.007
Does policy uncertainty affect mergers and acquisitions?
resolves10.1017/S0022109013000525
Real Assets and Capital Structure
resolves10.2139/ssrn.3945686
How Do Independent Directors View Generalist vs. Specialist CEOS? Evidence from an Exogenous Regulatory Shock
resolves10.1108/CG-08-2020-0353
Does board gender diversity matter? Evidence from hostile takeover vulnerability
resolves10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101678
Asset redeployability and the choice between bank debt and public debt
resolves10.2308/accr-51033
CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x
CEO Compensation and Board Structure
resolves10.1111/fire.12244
How do independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Evidence from a quasi‐natural experiment
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010
The costs of intense board monitoring
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.09.014
Asset liquidity, corporate investment, and endogenous financing costs
resolves10.1257/aer.101.4.1106
The Role of Trading Frictions in Real Asset Markets
resolves10.1111/1475-679X.12043
How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short‐Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency
resolves10.1108/CG-12-2019-0369
Ownership structure and audit quality: the mediating effect of board independence
resolves10.1111/fima.12066
Tradeoffs between Internal and External Governance: Evidence from Exogenous Regulatory Shocks
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01744.x
CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited
resolves10.1111/abac.12211
Asset Redeployability and Corporate Tax Avoidance
resolves10.1111/irfi.12144
How do Independent Directors Influence Corporate Risk‐Taking? Evidence from a Quasi‐Natural Experiment
resolves10.1080/13504851.2017.1412072
Estimating the effect of board independence on managerial ownership using a quasi-natural experiment
resolves10.1177/0312896217712334
Does board independence substitute for external audit quality? Evidence from an exogenous regulatory shock
resolves10.1016/j.frl.2015.12.008
How do independent directors view powerful CEOs? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment
resolves10.1080/13504851.2017.1329927
How do independent directors influence innovation productivity? A quasi-natural experiment
resolves10.1108/CG-04-2020-0156
Impact of corporate governance compliance and board attributes on operating liquidity in pre- and post-corporate governance reforms
resolves10.1108/CG-02-2014-0022
The impact of ownership and board structure on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting in the Turkish banking industry
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhv076
The Asset Redeployability Channel: How Uncertainty Affects Corporate Investment
resolves10.1093/rfs/hht020
The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence
resolves10.1108/CG-09-2016-0183
Can board gender diversity promote corporate social performance?
resolves10.1108/00251740410555443
Managerial myopia or systemic short‐termism?
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn084
The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors
resolves10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00050-5
Corporate investment myopia: a horserace of the theories
resolves10.2307/1884175
The Value of Waiting to Invest
resolves10.1002/smj.657
Exploring the debate on short‐termism: a theoretical and empirical analysis
resolves10.1509/jmkr.47.4.594
The Theory and Practice of Myopic Management
resolves10.1108/CG-03-2012-0015
Is director independence merely a box ticking exercise? A study of independence determinations in Irish listed companies
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02395.x
Managerial Incentives for Short‐term Results
resolves10.1016/j.frl.2021.102212
Does the market for corporate control impede or promote corporate innovation efficiency? Evidence from research quotient
resolves10.1108/CG-03-2020-0086
Exploring how independent directors view CSR inequality using a quasi-natural experiment
resolves10.1017/S0022109014000210
Real Asset Illiquidity and the Cost of Capital
resolves10.1080/07350015.2016.1227711
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence
resolves10.1108/CG-10-2019-0310
Do analysts’ recommendations reflect co-opted boards?
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00279.x
Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings
resolves10.1016/j.iref.2020.06.039
Does asset redeployability affect corporate investment and equity value?
resolves10.1177/1042258718806627
Are Founder-Led Firms Less Susceptible to Managerial Myopia?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04661.x
Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach
resolves10.1007/s11187-016-9767-0
Stock-financed M&As of newly listed firms
resolves10.1108/CG-09-2015-0123
Board director disciplinary and cognitive influence on corporate value creation
resolves10.1108/14720700510630068
The complex relation between director independence and board effectiveness
resolves10.1108/CG-12-2018-0365
Corporate governance and corporate internet reporting in sub-Saharan Africa:the case of Kenya and Tanzania
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04592.x
Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance
resolves10.1007/s11156-017-0635-z
Industry expertise on corporate boards
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior
no DOI — not checkedThe earnings game. Everyone plays, nobody wins
no DOI — not checkedThe Sarbanes–Oxley act and firms’ going-private decisions
no DOI — not checkedThe economic implications of corporate financial reporting
no DOI — not checkedShort-Term America: The Causes and Cures of Our Business Myopia
no DOI — not checkedGoing-private decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002: a cross-country analysis
no DOI — not checkedWhy do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations
no DOI — not checkedBoard involvement in corporate sustainability reporting: evidence from Sri Lanka, corporate governance
no DOI — not checkedHow do independent directors view powerful executive risk-taking incentives? A quasi-natural experiment
no DOI — not checkedDoes the market for corporate control influence executive risk-taking incentives? Evidence from takeover vulnerability
no DOI — not checkedCapital Choices: The Causes and Cures of Business Myopia
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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