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https://doi.org/10.1145/2956581
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1 of 40 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.5555/551283
The 39 checked references that resolve
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Learning in the Credit Card Market
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The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
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An evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner's curse
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Conjectural Equilibria and Rationalizability in a Game with Incomplete Information
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Learning in games with unstable equilibria
resolves10.1002/bdm.566
Overcoming the winner's curse: an adaptive learning perspective
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00054
Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
resolves10.1257/mic.1.1.207
The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study
resolves10.1006/game.1997.0544
Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results
resolves10.1006/jeth.1999.2576
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
resolves10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00121-0
Learning to play Bayesian games
resolves10.1257/aer.98.4.1269
Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00631.x
Cursed Equilibrium
resolves10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80016-8
Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria
resolves10.2307/2951716
Self-Confirming Equilibrium
resolves10.1073/pnas.1400987111
Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium
resolves10.2307/2586020
An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules
resolves10.1007/978-0-387-84858-7
The Elements of Statistical Learning
resolves10.1016/j.cognition.2009.12.009
Decisions from experience: Why small samples?
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2403865
The Realization Effect: Risk-Taking after Realized versus Paper Losses
resolves10.1126/science.1091721
Do Defaults Save Lives?
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511803475
Choices, Values, and Frames
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01411.x
Do Investors Overweight Personal Experience? Evidence from IPO Subscriptions
resolves10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006
Promoting cooperation in the field
resolves10.1093/qje/qjq004
Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk Taking?*
resolves10.1037/h0043158
The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information.
resolves10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00024
On Surprise, Change, and the Effect of Recent Outcomes
resolves10.1086/684229
When Punishment Doesn’t Pay: Cold Glow and Decisions to Punish
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2015.2233
Asymmetric Effects of Favorable and Unfavorable Information on Decision Making Under Ambiguity
resolves10.1038/ncomms5939
Humans display a ‘cooperative phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally stable
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2015.2168
Habits of Virtue: Creating Norms of Cooperation and Defection in the Laboratory
resolves10.1038/ncomms4677
Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation
resolves10.1177/2372732214548426
Harnessing Reciprocity to Promote Cooperation and the Provisioning of Public Goods
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00335
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
resolves10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80020-X
Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
resolves10.1371/journal.pone.0051876
Common (Mis)Beliefs about Memory: A Replication and Comparison of Telephone and Mechanical Turk Survey Methods
resolves10.1515/9781400845347
The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy
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Regression Shrinkage and Selection Via the Lasso
resolves10.1002/bdm.451
Focusing failures in competitive environments: explaining decision errors in the Monty Hall game, the Acquiring a Company problem, and multiparty ultimatums
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedC. Camerer. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
no DOI — not checkedI. Erev and E. Haruvy. 2013. Learning and the economics of small decisions. In The Handbook of Experimental Economics (2nd ed.) A. E. Roth and J. Kagel (Eds.). Forthcoming.
no DOI — not checkedD. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine. 1998. The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press Cambridge MA.
no DOI — not checkedP. W. Glimcher, E. Fehr, C. Camerer, and R. A. Poldrack. 2008. Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain. Academic Press, Cambridge, MA.
no DOI — not checkedJ. H. Kagel and D. Levin. 1986. The winner's curse and public information in common value auctions. American Economic Review 76, 894--920.
no DOI — not checkedD. K. Levine. 2012. Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? The Ordinary Versus the Extraordinary. Open Book Publishers, Cambridge, UK.
no DOI — not checkedA. Rubinstein A. Tversky and D. Heller. 1993. Naive Strategies in Zero-Sum Games. Sackler Institute of Economic Studies Ramat Aviv Tel-Aviv.
no DOI — not checkedW. F. Samuelson and M. H. Bazerman. 1985. Negotiation under the winner's curse. Research in Experimental Economics 3, 105--138.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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