Reference health
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
1 of 63 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-07-25
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
23 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.1017/S0003055400269712
The 62 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1162/002081802760403810
Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the Design of Monetary Institutions
resolves10.2307/2235106
The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments
resolves10.1093/wber/6.3.353
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
resolves10.1017/S0020818300033178
Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance
resolves10.3386/w7228
Exchange Rates in Emerging Economies: What Do We Know? What Do We Need to Know?
resolves10.1007/978-1-4615-2720-6_10
Designing a Central Bank in a Federal System: The Deutsche Bundesbank, 1957-1992
resolves10.2307/2077833
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence
resolves10.1162/002081802760403757
Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital
resolves10.1007/BF01048203
Variation in central bank independence across countries: Some provisional empirical evidence
resolves10.1162/002081898550635
Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money
resolves10.1162/002081802760403793
Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration
resolves10.2307/422333
Preemptive Strike: Central Bank Reform in Chile's Transition from Authoritarian Rule
resolves10.2307/3866082
The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability
resolves10.2307/2991831
Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation
resolves10.1162/002081802760403766
Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
resolves10.1017/S0020818300028472
Capital mobility, trade, and the domestic politics of economic policy
resolves10.2307/1073179
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies
resolves10.1017/S0043887100012867
Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92
resolves10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00045-2
Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence
resolves10.2307/2130595
On the Demand for Economic Outcomes: Macroeconomic Performance and Mass Political Support in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany
resolves10.1086/654279
Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence
resolves10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.317
T<scp>HE</scp>P<scp>OLITICAL</scp>E<scp>CONOMY OF</scp>I<scp>NTERNATIONAL</scp>M<scp>ONETARY</scp>R<scp>ELATIONS</scp>
resolves10.1162/002081898550644
Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union
resolves10.1162/002081898550563
International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies
resolves10.1007/978-94-011-0850-8_7
Commitment through Delegation, Political Influence and Central Bank Independence
resolves10.1111/0020-8833.00138
Domestic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments in the Developing World
resolves10.2307/2586015
Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy
resolves10.2307/139336
Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates
The 23 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedWhat is the ‘Acceptable’ Rate of Inflation?
no DOI — not checkedThe Currency Game: Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility Versus Flexibility
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Contracts for Central Bankers
no DOI — not checkedCentral Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - An International Perspective
no DOI — not checkedCentral Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence: Theory and Evidence
no DOI — not checkedMonetary Politics: Exchange Rate Cooperation in the European Union
no DOI — not checkedNBER Macroeconomics Annual
no DOI — not checkedContested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies
no DOI — not checkedCentral Bank Independence and Monetary Stability
no DOI — not checkedPrinceton Studies in International Finance
no DOI — not checkedA Theory of Optimum Currency Areas
no DOI — not checkedDoes Central Bank Independence Really Matter? New Evidence for Developing Countries Using a New Indicator
no DOI — not checkedGatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries
no DOI — not checkedThe Politics Of Inflation And Economic Stagnation: Theoretical Approaches and International Case Studies
no DOI — not checkedSpecial Papers in International Economics
no DOI — not checkedCentral Bank Reform: The Federal Reserve in International Perspective
no DOI — not checkedMonetary Problems of the International Economy
no DOI — not checkedLimiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The European Monetary System
no DOI — not checkedPolitical and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
no DOI — not checkedOne Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade
no DOI — not checkedGoals, Guidelines, and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Currency Areas
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-07-25 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1162/002081802760403748"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1162/002081802760403748/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1162/002081802760403748)