Reference health

Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests

https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002794038002004
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18/18 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-25

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

23 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 18 checked references that resolve
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War and Reason
resolves10.1177/0022002784028004002
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976
resolves10.2307/1957394
Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War
resolves10.1177/0022002790034002005
The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons
resolves10.2307/2010184
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
resolves10.2307/2600411
Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation
resolves10.2307/2938956
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models
resolves10.2307/2010407
Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence
resolves10.1177/0022002791035002006
Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior
resolves10.1177/0022002783027002001
Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976
resolves10.1080/05679326808448106
Rationality in Deterrence
resolves10.2307/2111116
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining
resolves10.1177/073889428600900202
Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation
resolves10.2307/2538867
Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War
resolves10.7591/9781501737831
Israel and Conventional Deterrence
resolves10.7591/9780801468629
The Ideology of the Offensive
resolves10.2307/1882010
Job Market Signaling
resolves10.2307/1963848
Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First
The 23 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedNuclear blackmail and nuclear balance
no DOI — not checkedHandbook of international crises
no DOI — not checkedannual meetings of the American Political Science Association
no DOI — not checkedFearon, J. 1992. Threats to use force: The role of costly signals in international crises. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.
no DOI — not checkedAmerican Political Science Review
no DOI — not checkedDeterrence debates
no DOI — not checkedDeterrence in American foreign policy
no DOI — not checkedExtended deterrence and the prevention of war
no DOI — not checkedNomos: Coercion
no DOI — not checkedPerception and misperception in international politics
no DOI — not checkedLebow, R. N., and J. G. Stein. 1990a. The 1984 Huth and Russett data set. Typescript, Cornell University.
no DOI — not checkedWhen does deterrence succeed and how do we know?
no DOI — not checkedInterstate crisis behavior, 1816-1980: Realism versus reciprocity
no DOI — not checkedConventional deterrence
no DOI — not checkedDeterrence: A conceptual analysis
no DOI — not checkedModels of strategic choice in politics
no DOI — not checkedForce, order, and justice
no DOI — not checkedThe sources of military doctrine
no DOI — not checkedNuclear deterrence theory: The problem of credibility
no DOI — not checkedArms and influence
no DOI — not checkedThe wages of war, 1816-1965: A statistical handbook
no DOI — not checkedConflict among nations: Bargaining, decision making, and system structure in international crises
no DOI — not checkedVan Evera, S. 1984. Causes of war. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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