Reference health
Board Independence and Corporate Misconduct: A Cross-National Meta-Analysis
2 of 112 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-02
At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.
26 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
References needing attention
does not resolve to a known work10.5465/amr.1995.9503271999
does not resolve to a known work10.5465/AMBPP.2015.5440
The 110 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1108/03074350010766990
The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud
resolves10.5465/19416520.2015.1024503
Connecting the Dots: Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle
resolves10.2307/30040732
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants
resolves10.5465/amj.2006.23478165
A Changing of the Guard: Executive and Director Turnover Following Corporate Financial Restatements
resolves10.1177/014920639402000401
Pressure, Opportunity and Predisposition: A Multivariate Model of Corporate Illegality
resolves10.2307/257023
PAYING THE PIPER: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF LONGER-TERM FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR.
resolves10.5465/amj.2009.0862
Watchdog or Lapdog? A Behavioral View of the Media as a Corporate Governance Mechanism
resolves10.1002/smj.2338
Using meta‐analytic structural equation modeling to advance strategic management research: Guidelines and an empirical illustration via the strategic leadership‐performance relationship
resolves10.1080/026783700417230
Role clarity, work overload and organizational support: Multilevel evidence of the importance of support
resolves10.5465/19416520.2016.1120957
Are Boards Designed to Fail? The Implausibility of Effective Board Monitoring
resolves10.1016/S0929-1199(96)00013-2
Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.013
Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation
resolves10.1016/j.intacc.2008.12.004
Crossed-listed foreign firms' earnings informativeness, earnings management and disclosures of corporate governance information under SOX
resolves10.5465/amj.2013.0351
Passing Probation: Earnings Management by Interim CEOs and Its Effect on Their Promotion Prospects
resolves10.1177/1094428115619013
Correcting for Self-selection Based Endogeneity in Management Research
resolves10.1002/smj.913
Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter
resolves10.1057/s41267-016-0063-7
Law, finance, and the international mobility of corporate governance
resolves10.1111/j.1540-5915.1999.tb01602.x
On the Measurements of Board Composition: Poor Consistency and a Serious Mismatch of Theory and Operationalization
resolves10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490410
Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of Directors: An International Perspective
resolves10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199803)19:3<269::AID-SMJ950>3.0.CO;2-K
Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance
resolves10.1177/0149206310373399
Integration of Micro and Macro Studies in Governance Research: CEO Duality, Board Composition, and Financial Performance
resolves10.1007/s10551-014-2196-6
The Effect of Ethical Leadership Behavior on Ethical Climate, Turnover Intention, and Affective Commitment
resolves10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00753.x
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Meta‐Analysis
resolves10.5465/amj.2012.0491
How Firms Respond to Financial Restatement: CEO Successors and External Reactions
resolves10.1007/s10551-013-1700-8
Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets?
resolves10.5465/19416521003654186
Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct
resolves10.1080/00014788.2015.1039477
Problem directors on the audit committee and financial reporting quality
resolves10.5465/amr.2005.17293355
Executive Job Demands: New Insights for Explaining Strategic Decisions and Leader Behaviors
resolves10.5465/amr.2014.0066
The Quad Model for Identifying a Corporate Director’s Potential for Effective Monitoring: Toward a New Theory of Board Sufficiency
resolves10.1287/orsc.1060.0241
Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation
resolves10.5465/amj.2016.0471
Saving Face: How Exit in Response to Negative Press and Star Analyst Downgrades Reflects Reputation Maintenance by Directors
resolves10.1111/joms.12247
An Institutional Configurational Approach to Cross‐National Diversity in Corporate Governance
resolves10.1016/B978-0-08-057065-5.50010-5
Estimation of a Single Effect Size: Parametric and Nonparametric Methods
resolves10.1287/orsc.1080.0355
Directors' Multiple Identities, Identification, and Board Monitoring and Resource Provision
resolves10.1016/j.jom.2011.06.006
Safety hazard and time to recall: The role of recall strategy, product defect type, and supply chain player in the U.S. toy industry
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
resolves10.5465/amj.2012.0253
The Structural Elaboration of Board Independence: Executive Power, Institutional Logics, and the Adoption of CEO-Only Board Structures in U.S. Corporate Governance
resolves10.1111/joms.12102
Formal and Informal Corruption Environments and Multinational Enterprise Social Irresponsibility
resolves10.2307/255945
RESEARCH NOTES. BOARD COMPOSITION AND THE COMMISSION OF ILLEGAL ACTS: AN INVESTIGATION OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES.
resolves10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400103
Globalization and convergence in corporate governance: evidence from Infosys and the Indian software industry
resolves10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00059-9
Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management
resolves10.5465/amj.2011.0121
Apprentice, Departure, and Demotion: An Examination of the Three Types of CEO–Board Chair Separation
resolves10.5465/amj.2015.0852
Compromise on the Board: Investigating the Antecedents and Consequences of Lead Independent Director Appointment
resolves10.1111/j.1099-1123.2009.00403.x
Audit Quality, Corporate Governance, and Earnings Management: A Meta‐Analysis
resolves10.1111/j.1744-6570.1978.tb00446.x
THE INTERACTION OF ABILITY AND MOTIVATION IN PERFORMANCE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE MEANING OF MODERATORS<sup>1</sup>
resolves10.1016/0030-5073(71)90007-9
Role clarity, need for clarity, satisfaction, tension, and withdrawal
resolves10.1093/icc/4.2.293
The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives
resolves10.2469/faj.v62.n3.4155
Governance and Performance Changes after Accusations of Corporate Fraud
resolves10.5465/amr.2008.32465769
Ending Corruption: The Interplay Among Institutional Logics, Resources, and Institutional Entrepreneurs
resolves10.5465/amj.2010.52814578
Why “Good” Firms do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High Expectations, and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality
resolves10.5465/amr.2006.19379621
Conflicts Of Interest And The Case Of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction And Strategic Issue Cycling
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2133283
Does Corporate Governance Affect Earnings Management? Evidence from an Exogenous Shock to Governance in Korea
resolves10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400144
The Anglo-American financial influence on CEO compensation in non-Anglo-American firms
resolves10.1504/IJMDM.2014.065353
Do characteristics of audit committees and board of directors influence earnings management?
resolves10.1002/smj.4250160202
Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms
resolves10.5465/amj.2009.0007
Why a Central Network Position Isn't Enough: The Role of Motivation and Ability for Knowledge Sharing in Employee Networks
resolves10.1111/1467-8683.00258
A Meta‐analysis of Board Leadership Structure and Financial Performance: are “two heads better than one”?
resolves10.1002/smj.2136
The perils of endogeneity and instrumental variables in strategy research: Understanding through simulations
resolves10.1002/smj.2400
Buying bad behavior: Tournament incentives and securities class action lawsuits
resolves10.1287/orsc.2014.0896
The Emotion-Evoked Collective Corruption Model: The Role of Emotion in the Spread of Corruption Within Organizations
resolves10.1057/jibs.2012.6
An institution-based view of executive compensation: A multilevel meta-analytic test
resolves10.1007/s10490-011-9269-1
Corporate boards and the performance of Asian firms: A meta-analysis
resolves10.1177/0149206315579510
The Relationship Between Tenure and Outside Director Task Involvement: A Social Identity Perspective
resolves10.2307/2393674
Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board Independence from Management
resolves10.2307/3556678
Keeping Directors in Line: Social Distancing as a Control Mechanism in the Corporate Elite
resolves10.5465/19416520.2013.783669
A Behavioral Theory of Corporate Governance: Explicating the Mechanisms of Socially Situated and Socially Constituted Agency
resolves10.1002/smj.2030
Executive turnover in the stock option backdating wave: The impact of social context
resolves10.1177/1094428106296638
Methodology for Dealing With Duplicate Study Effects in a Meta-Analysis
resolves10.1002/smj.2277
Throwing caution to the wind: The effect of CEO stock option pay on the incidence of product safety problems
resolves10.1016/S0929-1199(02)00006-8
Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x
Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors
resolves10.1177/000312240406900306
The Social Construction of Market Value: Institutionalization and Learning Perspectives on Stock Market Reactions
The 26 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedPay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
no DOI — not checkedbibr18-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedGroups at work: Theory and research
no DOI — not checkedBryant C., Milne R. 2015. Boardroom politics at heart of VW scandla: Observers highlight lack of diversity, expertise and independence. Financial Times, October 4. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/e816cf86-6815-11e5-a57f-21b88f7d973f.
no DOI — not checkedbibr30-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedbibr47-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedStrategic leadership: Theory and research on executives, top management teams, and boards
no DOI — not checkedbibr62-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedbibr65-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedbibr68-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedDatabase challenges in financial misconduct research
no DOI — not checkedKaufmann D., Kraay A. 2015. Worldwide Governance Indiciators (WGI). Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
no DOI — not checkedPractical meta-analysis
no DOI — not checkedRediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics
no DOI — not checkedbibr89-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedbibr93-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2015. OECD corporate governance factbook. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Factbook.pdf
no DOI — not checkedbibr101-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedbibr108-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedbibr109-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedbibr111-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedbibr112-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedInstitutions and Organizations
no DOI — not checkedbibr124-0149206318801999
no DOI — not checkedWilson D. B. 2005. SPSS for Windows meta-analysis macros [Computer software]. Available at http://mason.gmu.edu/~dwilsonb/ma.html
no DOI — not checkedThe state of responsible competitiveness 2007: Making sustainable development count in global markets
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-08-02 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1177/0149206318801999"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1177/0149206318801999/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.1177/0149206318801999)