Reference health
Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity
77/77 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 77 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00006-4
Altruism, equity, and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: an encompassing approach
resolves10.1006/game.2000.0805
Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A Social Utility Analysis
resolves10.1086/209891
When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets
resolves10.2307/1911307
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
resolves10.1086/261868
Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality
resolves10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00048-3
Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games
resolves10.1007/BF01243036
An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
resolves10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00094-5
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
resolves10.1257/aer.91.2.73
In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies
resolves10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
resolves10.1037/h0035519
Undermining children's intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: A test of the "overjustification" hypothesis.
resolves10.1006/jeth.2000.2668
On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: An Incomplete Information Scenario
resolves10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00078-0
On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences
resolves10.2307/2118366
Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
resolves10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80082-7
Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, nash and the secret handshake
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(73)90066-5
Do Walras' identity and continuity characterize the class of community excess demand functions?
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedp_7
no DOI — not checkedp_19
no DOI — not checkedp_26
no DOI — not checkedp_27
no DOI — not checkedp_32
no DOI — not checkedp_84
no DOI — not checkedp_85
no DOI — not checkedp_93
no DOI — not checkedp_98
no DOI — not checkedp_105
no DOI — not checkedp_113
no DOI — not checkedp_118
no DOI — not checkedp_123
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work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-08-03 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
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