Reference health
A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making
33/33 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-25
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 33 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00087-5
Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining
resolves10.1007/BF00452887
Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
resolves10.1006/jeth.2001.2820
Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn Model
resolves10.1016/0165-1765(89)90225-5
The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
resolves10.1007/BF00056369
The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
resolves10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.092601.141138
B
<scp>ARGAINING</scp>
T
<scp>HEORY AND</scp>
I
<scp>NTERNATIONAL</scp>
C
<scp>ONFLICT</scp>
resolves10.2307/1884470
Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy
resolves10.2307/1914198
A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedPositive Political Theory I: Collective Preference
no DOI — not checkedA Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
no DOI — not checkedA Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries
no DOI — not checkedA General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making
no DOI — not checkedThe Economics of Bargaining
no DOI — not checkedThe Theory of Committees and Elections
no DOI — not checkedSocial Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks
no DOI — not checkedCorporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates from a Bargaining Model
no DOI — not checkedA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule
no DOI — not checkedThe Generic Existence of a Core for q-Rules
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