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Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay

https://doi.org/10.1561/1400000043
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66/66 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-15

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

35 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

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The 35 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedBusiness Wire (2017) Segal Marco Advisors Corporate Governance News: 146 Companies Move from Triennial to Annual Say-on-Pay Votes in 2017 http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170808006082/en/Segal-Marco-Advisors-Corporate-Governance-News-146 August 8
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no DOI — not checkedKaplan S. (2007) Testimony of Steven N. Kaplan on empowering shareholders on executive compensation and H.R. 1257, the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act Before the Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives
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no DOI — not checkedStendhal M. (2012) Say-On-Pay gets a lift as Citigroup CEO steps down https://www.law360.com/articles/387192/say-on-pay-gets-a-lift-as-citigroup-ceo-steps-down
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