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The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1000088
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1 of 18 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1007/bf01426213
The 17 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/1879431
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
resolves10.1162/0033553041502225
A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.004
An experimental study of storable votes
resolves10.1257/aer.96.5.1737
Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00810.x
Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00631.x
Cursed Equilibrium
resolves10.1162/003355399556151
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
resolves10.2307/2555690
Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-bid Auctions
resolves10.1007/s10683-005-5374-7
Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.006
Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
resolves10.1515/9781400830138
Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
resolves10.1006/game.1995.1023
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1
Information, trade and common knowledge
resolves10.2307/2951751
Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
resolves10.1016/0047-2727(95)01544-2
Altuism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments
resolves10.1006/game.1995.1031
On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedThe Loser's Curse
no DOI — not checkedProduct Quality, Consumer Information, and 'Lemons'in Experimental Markets
no DOI — not checkedUnraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref26
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-28 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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