Reference health

The Optimal Length of Contracts With Application to Outsourcing

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1002305
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26/26 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

33 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 26 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1093/jleo/15.3.704
The role of risk in contract choice
resolves10.2307/2696361
Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
resolves10.1162/003355302753399445
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
resolves10.1162/jeea.2007.5.5.953
Contract Duration and Investment Incentives: Evidence from Land Tenancy Agreements
resolves10.1109/hicss.2003.1174788
IT outsourcing contracts: practical implications of the incomplete contract theory
resolves10.2139/ssrn.383700
Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchise Contracts
resolves10.1257/aer.89.1.125
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
resolves10.2307/2555660
Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length
resolves10.1177/026839629801300303
Using Multiple Suppliers to Mitigate the Risk of it Outsourcing at ICI and Wessex Water
resolves10.3386/w5007
Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment
resolves10.1093/jleo/ewj006
Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments
resolves10.1086/467141
Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke
resolves10.2307/1911498
Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach
resolves10.1086/261404
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
resolves10.1257/000282805775014452
Contracting on Time
resolves10.2307/2526732
On the Duration of Agreements
resolves10.1093/0198288816.001.0001
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
resolves10.1086/261729
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
resolves10.1162/003355300555448
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
resolves10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
resolves10.2307/249670
An Empirical Investigation of Information Technology Sourcing Practices: Lessons from Experience1
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511613807.016
Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting
resolves10.2307/3003668
Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract
resolves10.2307/2696351
Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments
resolves10.2307/1885724
The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach
resolves10.2139/ssrn.313680
Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
The 33 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedContracts as a Barrier to Entry
no DOI — not checkedRisk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts
no DOI — not checkedContract Manufacturing: Does the Manufacturing Corporation Have a Future?
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref12
no DOI — not checked$25M Deal sets HBOS on path to a single platform for insurance
no DOI — not checkedXerox, EDS Sign Outsourcing, Joint Marketing Agreements
no DOI — not checkedUnfair Contractual Practices and Hostages in Franchise Contracts
no DOI — not checkedOld Tricks For New Chips
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Contracts with Lock-in
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedUtility-Based Computing: More Than Meets the Eye
no DOI — not checkedFederal IT Outsourcing Spending To Reach $15 Billion
no DOI — not checkedContract Duration and Relationship-Speci�c Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets
no DOI — not checkedPizza Hut
no DOI — not checkedThe Determinants of Coal Contract Duration for the Powder River Basin
no DOI — not checkedVertical Integration
no DOI — not checkedVertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement
no DOI — not checkedIf It Looks Like an Outsourcing Deal and Walks Like an Outsourcing Deal
no DOI — not checkedThe Value Of Selective IT Sourcing
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedOutsourcing in the Electronics Industry. Determinants of Contract Duration
no DOI — not checkedInvestments, Hold-up, and the Form of Market Contracts
no DOI — not checkedref47
no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedOffshoring Helps IT Services Grow 6% in 2003
no DOI — not checkedref51
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedref55
no DOI — not checkedAmerican Express Signs $4B IT Services Deal With IBM
no DOI — not checkedP&G Awards $3B Outsourcing Contract to HP
no DOI — not checkedref59
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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