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Security Design in Initial Public Offerings

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1008411
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 44 checked references that resolve
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Security Design
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Ownership dispersion, costly information, and IPO underpricing
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Market microstructure and asset pricing: On the compensation for illiquidity in stock returns
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Why Include Warrants in New Equity Issues? A Theory of Unit IPOs
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Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation
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Liquidity and stock returns: An alternative test
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00004
A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhj018
IPO Underpricing and After-Market Liquidity
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00054-x
Information production, dilution costs, and optimal security design
resolves10.1093/rfs/14.4.1183
Rational Beliefs and Security Design
resolves10.1086/431444
Unit IPOs: What the Warrant Characteristics Reveal about the Issuing Firm*
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb05063.x
Signalling and the Pricing of New Issues
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(93)90017-6
Price stabilization in the market for new issues
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(94)00797-5
Evidence on the strategic allocation of initial public offerings
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(89)90048-2
The design of securities
resolves10.1007/bf00245997
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resolves10.1086/321933
Warrants in Initial Public Offerings: Empirical Evidence
resolves10.1111/j.1468-036x.2009.00510.x
Security Choice and Corporate Governance
resolves10.1016/1062-9769(94)90030-2
The underpricing of ‘unit’ initial public offerings
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
resolves10.1093/rfs/12.2.227
The Demand for Stocks: An Analysis of IPO Auctions
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(93)90020-c
The winner's curse, legal liability, and the long-run price performance of initial public offerings in Finland
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(89)90058-5
A direct test of Rock's model of the pricing of unseasoned issues
resolves10.1007/bf01213817
On the structure and diversity of rational beliefs
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Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?
resolves10.2307/2326770
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
resolves10.1093/rfs/4.2.361
Design and Marketing of Financial Products
resolves10.1093/rfs/7.2.279
The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling Theories
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
resolves10.1093/rfs/7.1.1
Optimal Design of Securities under Asymmetric Information
resolves10.1007/s10679-005-2987-9
Rationing in IPOs
resolves10.2307/2297853
Adverse Selection and Security Design
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00478
A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(86)90054-1
Why new issues are underpriced
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(93)90015-4
Underwriter price support and the IPO underpricing puzzle
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(90)90065-8
The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(93)90018-7
Unit initial public offerings
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04638.x
Optimal Financial Instruments
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedCorporate Financial Structure, Incentives and Optimal Contracting
no DOI — not checkedref10
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