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The Impact of Corporate Governance on Discretionary Accrual Changes Around the Sarbanes-Oxley Act*

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1011844
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1 of 30 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2978933
The 29 checked references that resolve
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Audit Committee Characteristics and Restatements
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.01.004
Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt
resolves10.2469/dig.v27.n2.79
An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.1998.tb00547.x
The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management*
resolves10.2308/aud.2004.23.2.13
The Effect of Audit Committee Expertise, Independence, and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management
resolves10.1016/s0165-4101(97)00017-7
Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses
resolves10.2308/accr.2000.75.4.453
Audit Committee Composition and Auditor Reporting
resolves10.2308/accr.2003.78.4.931
Client Importance, Nonaudit Services, and Abnormal Accruals
resolves10.2139/ssrn.658782
Trends in Earnings Management and Informativeness of Earnings Announcements in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods
resolves10.2307/256988
NUMBER OF DIRECTORS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: A META-ANALYSIS.
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x
Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*
resolves10.1016/0165-4101(94)90008-6
Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00003-8
Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms
resolves10.1086/467038
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
resolves10.2307/2491279
Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosures
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.06.003
The market pricing of accruals quality
resolves10.1016/0165-4101(79)90004-1
Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice
resolves10.3386/w8161
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
resolves10.1111/1475-679x.00041
Errors in Estimating Accruals: Implications for Empirical Research
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
resolves10.2139/ssrn.172060
Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns: Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(92)90029-w
The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
resolves10.1016/0165-4101(94)90030-2
Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00018-5
Board meeting frequency and firm performance
resolves10.1177/031289627700200104
Corporate Financial Statements, A Product of the Market and Political Processes
resolves10.1016/s0929-1199(02)00006-8
Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
resolves10.1177/014920638901500208
Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative Model
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedAppraising boardroom performance
no DOI — not checkedEndogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedEarnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings
no DOI — not checkedTowards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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