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Hedge Funds vs. Private Equity Funds as Shareholder Activists - Differences in Value Creation

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1015714
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1 of 51 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-09-30

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References needing attention

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The 19 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedThe Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals Boston University Law Review
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no DOI — not checkedHedge Fund Activism
no DOI — not checkedLeveraged Buyouts: Wealth created or wealth redistributed
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no DOI — not checkedThe Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder activism
no DOI — not checkedGetting politics out of public pension funds
no DOI — not checkedThe politics of public pension funds
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