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Coalition Governments and Sovereign Debt Crises

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1017147
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 46 checked references that resolve
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Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
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Crises and Liquidity
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Political Power and the Credibility of Government Debt
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Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others
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Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture
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Computing Interaction Effects and Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models
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The 21 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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