Reference health
Organizational Form and Performance: Evidence from the Hotel Industry
49/49 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 49 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1086/467067
The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets
resolves10.1086/322815
The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws That Limit That Choice
resolves10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.02.009
Instrumental quantile regression inference for structural and treatment effect models
resolves10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490039
Modal Choice in a World of Alliances: Analyzing Organizational Forms in the International Hotel Sector
resolves10.1080/02642060701673737
Standardisation versus Adaptation: Geographical Pressures to Deviate from Franchise Formats
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00120.x
Does vertical integration affect firm performance? Evidence from the airline industry
resolves10.1093/jleo/ewn004
Revenue Sharing Distortions and Vertical Integration in the Movie Industry
resolves10.1080/07350015.1997.10524717
Do Fast-Food Chains Price Discriminate on the Race and Income Characteristics of an Area?
resolves10.1257/000282804322970823
Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California
resolves10.2307/1593771
Multi-Unit Ownership in Franchising: Evidence from the Fast-Food Industry in Texas
resolves10.1257/mic.5.3.157
Too Far Away? The Effect of Distance to Headquarters on Business Establishment Performance
resolves10.2307/2937907
Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511613807.018
Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts: substitutes or complements?
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(96)00867-0
Incomplete contracts and the choice between vertical integration and franchising
resolves10.19030/jabr.v11i2.5868
A Preliminary Investigation Of Ownership Conversions In Franchised Distribution Systems
resolves10.1002/mde.4090140205
Transaction costs, mistakes, and performance: Assessing the importance of governance
resolves10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00024.x
<scp>Retail Contracting and Organizational Form: Alternatives to Chain Affiliation in the Motel Industry</scp>
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00125-6
The effect of organizational form on quality: the case of franchising
resolves10.2307/2109724
An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate Variables on Micro Units
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1080.0922
How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry
resolves10.2307/256637
HYBRID ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRM GROWTH AND SURVIVAL: A STUDY OF NEW FRANCHISORS.
resolves10.1287/mnsc.44.4.571
Accounting for Endogeneity When Assessing Strategy Performance: Does Entry Mode Choice Affect FDI Survival?
resolves10.2307/2555953
Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00305
Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer‐owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?
resolves10.1086/467010
Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution
resolves10.1257/jep.24.2.83
The Other Transformation in Econometric Practice: Robust Tools for Inference
resolves10.1023/A:1008150819999
Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies
resolves10.1016/s0883-9026(97)00100-6
Why do entrepreneurs become franchisees? an empirical analysis of organizational choice
resolves10.1016/0304-4076(94)01645-g
Selection corrections for panel data models under conditional mean independence assumptions
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedTables from Employment and Earnings: B-3. Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls by Major Industry Sector and Selected Industry Detail
no DOI — not checkedSelectivity Bias: New Developments.Varieties of Selection Bias
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedAllocative Efficiency vs
no DOI — not checkedref55
no DOI — not checkedDo Organization Choices Matter? Assessing the Importance of Governance through Performance Comparisons
no DOI — not checkedref60
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