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Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanisms

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1070168
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 38 checked references that resolve
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Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual‐Class Firms
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The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedRegression standard errors in clustered samples
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