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What Determines the Composition of Banks' Loan Portfolios? Evidence from Transition Countries
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The 29 checked references that resolve
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Further Evidence on the Link between Finance and Growth: An International Analysis of Community Banking and Economic Performance
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The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses
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Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure
resolves10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00055-x
Soft budget constraints and credit crunches in financial transition
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How Good is the Bankscope Database? A Cross-Validation Exercise with Correction Factors for Market Concentration Measures
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Financial Sector Development in Transition Economies: Lessons from the First Decade
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.04.002
The impact of banking sector reform in a transition economy: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan
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Finance, economic development and the transition: the East German case
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Bank Lending to Small Businesses in Latin America: Does Bank Origin Matter?
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Foreign Banks in Transition Countries: To Whom Do They Lend and How Are They Financed?
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Foreign banks and credit stability in Central and Eastern Europe. A panel data analysis
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Financial Integration and Firm Performance: Evidence from Foreign Bank Entry in Emerging Markets
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'Lending by Example': Direct and Indirect Effects of Foreign Banks in Emerging Markets
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.018
Regional growth and finance in Europe: Is there a quality effect of bank efficiency?
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Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending
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Asymmetric information and the mode of entry in foreign credit markets
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAcquisition versus greenfield: The impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on information and bank lending rates
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedInternal capital markets and lending by multinational bank subsidiaries
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedDo bank mergers reduce lending to businesses and farmers? New evidence from tenth district states
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no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedAll variables are described in Table 2. The omitted ownership group is formed by private domestic banks. In columns 1 and 3, standard errors are clustered at the country level. In column 2, we include country fixed effects. In column 3, the instruments for the perception of collateral law are the World Bank Doing Business indicator on "depth of credit information" for 2004 and the EBRD legal indicator on the enforcement of charged assets. In column 3, we report a Hansen J-test statistic of over-identifying restrictions along with its p-value (using robust standard errors). In column 4, we use a two-step Heckman selection procedure. The variables in the selection equation are bank characteristics (ownership structure and size
no DOI — not checkedThis table shows the results of regressions of the (logistic transformation of) the proportion of SME lending in total bank lending on bank characteristics (ownership structure and size), per capita GDP, and an index of banks' perception of the quality of collateral laws. The sample consists of a cross-section of banks in 20 transition countries in 2004. All variables are described in Table 2. The omitted ownership group is formed by private domestic banks. In columns 1 and 3, standard errors are clustered at the country level. In column 2, we include country fixed effects. In column 3, the instruments for the perception of collateral law are the World Bank Doing Business indicator on "depth of credit information" for 2004 and the EBRD legal indicator on the enforcement of charged assets. In column 3, we report a Hansen J-test statistic of over-identifying restrictions along with its p-value (using robust standard errors). In column 4, we use a two-step Heckman selection procedure. The variables in the selection equation are bank characteristics (ownership structure and size
no DOI — not checkedThis table shows the results of regressions of the (logistic transformation of) the proportion of lending to large firms in total bank lending on bank characteristics (ownership structure and size), per capita GDP, and an index of banks' perception of the quality of collateral laws. The sample consists of a cross-section of banks in 20 transition countries in 2004. All variables are described in Table 2. The omitted ownership group is formed by private domestic banks. In columns 1 and 3, standard errors are clustered at the country level. In column 2, we include country fixed effects. In column 3, the instruments for the perception of collateral law are the World Bank Doing Business indicator on "depth of credit information" for 2004 and the EBRD legal indicator on the enforcement of charged assets. In column 3, we report a Hansen J-test statistic of over-identifying restrictions along with its p-value (using robust standard errors). In column 4, we use a two-step Heckman selection procedure. The variables in the selection equation are bank characteristics (ownership structure and size
no DOI — not checkedThis table shows the results of regressions of the (logistic transformation of) the proportion of lending to foreign firms in total bank lending on bank characteristics (ownership structure and size), per capita GDP, and an index of banks' perception of the quality of collateral laws. The sample consists of a cross-section of banks in 20 transition countries in 2004. All variables are described in Table 2. The omitted ownership group is formed by private domestic banks. In columns 1 and 3, standard errors are clustered at the country level. In column 2, we include country fixed effects. In column 3, the instruments for the perception of collateral law are the World Bank Doing Business indicator on "depth of credit information" for 2004 and the EBRD legal indicator on the enforcement of charged assets. In column 3, we report a Hansen J-test statistic of over-identifying restrictions along with its p-value (using robust standard errors). In column 4, we use a two-step Heckman selection procedure. The variables in the selection equation are bank characteristics (ownership structure and size
no DOI — not checked10 (*) levels. Sources: BEPS and BankScope Note: This table shows the results of regressions of the (logistic transformation of) the proportion of lending to state-owned enterprises in total bank lending on bank characteristics (ownership structure and size), per capita GDP, and an index of banks' perception of the quality of collateral laws. The sample consists of a cross-section of banks in 20 transition countries in 2004. All variables are described in Table 2. The omitted ownership group is formed by private domestic banks
no DOI — not checkedref42
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