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The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust: An Extended Discussion

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091531
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

103 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 89 checked references that resolve
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no DOI — not checkedThe A & P Case
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no DOI — not checkedReport of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission
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no DOI — not checkedEconomies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries
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no DOI — not checkedThe Antitrust Revolution
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no DOI — not checkedProfits, Market Structure, and Portfolio Risk
no DOI — not checkedPredatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy
no DOI — not checkedPredatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards
no DOI — not checkedDominant Firm Response to Competitive Challenge: Peripheral Manufacturers' Suits against IBM (1979-1983)
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no DOI — not checkedThe Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return: Reply
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no DOI — not checkedBringing More Competition to Real Estate Brokerage
no DOI — not checkedPractices That Facilitate Cooperation: The Ethyl Case
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no DOI — not checkedNonprice Predation and Attempted Monopolization: The Coffee (General Foods) Case
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no DOI — not checkedThe Effects of Economic Regulation
no DOI — not checkedExclusive Dealing and Antitrust Exclusion: U.S. v. Dentsply
no DOI — not checkedCritical Loss: Let's Tell the Whole Story
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no DOI — not checkedManifest Destiny? The Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroad Merger (1996)
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no DOI — not checkedRecent Merger Cases Reflect Revolution in Antitrust Policy
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no DOI — not checkedTying and Exclusive Dealing: Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde
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no DOI — not checkedThe Tobacco Case of 1946
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no DOI — not checkedResale Price Maintenance Reexamined: Monsanto v. Spray-Rite
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no DOI — not checkedThe 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm
no DOI — not checkedIdentifying Exclusionary Conduct under Section 2: The 'No Economic Sense Test
no DOI — not checkedUnilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers
no DOI — not checkedSearching for the Critical Concentration Ratio: An Application of the 'Switching of Regimes' Technique
no DOI — not checkedAntitrust and Video Markets: The Merger of Showtime and the Movie Channel as a Case Study
no DOI — not checkedThe Revolution in Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Relationships: How Did We Get from There to Here?
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no DOI — not checkedMarket Power and Market Definition in Monopolization Cases: A Paradigm is Missing
no DOI — not checkedReport of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy
no DOI — not checkedCompetition and Monopoly in American Industry
no DOI — not checkedEconomies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs
no DOI — not checkedEconomics and Antitrust Enforcement: Transition Years
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