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The (Misunderstood) Genius of American Corporate Law

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1105904
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12/12 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

39 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 12 checked references that resolve
resolves10.4337/9781782546856.00024
Preserving director primacy by managing shareholder interventions
resolves10.5040/9781472558909.ch-002
Public Beginnings, Private Ends—Should Corporate Law Privilege the Interests of Shareholders?
resolves10.1021/ba-1993-0232.ix002
Subject Index
resolves10.1007/978-3-7091-5685-8_3
Die Geschlechtszellen (Gameten)
resolves10.1142/9789813200838_0002
THE SUPRA-SURPLUS SOCIETY
resolves10.1037/h0038786
Editorial note.
resolves10.2307/3312981
The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching
resolves10.2307/1073029
The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes
resolves10.1017/s0250569x00012097
Declaraciones interpretativas
resolves10.1163/ilwo-vf34
V.F.34 Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation (2 Aug 78). See Basic Document V.C.3, supra
resolves10.1016/j.geobios.2008.07.005
Note on Sestrosphaera liasina (Pia, 1920) from the Lowermost Jurassic of Malga Mandrielle (type-locality, Southern Alps – Italy)
resolves10.2307/1229668
The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law
The 39 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedOpting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH
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no DOI — not checkedThe Constitution 120 Such rules might be seen as the converse of the "market perfecting" rules which Easterbrook sees as welcome in the marketplace of corporate law. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedThe End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top
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no DOI — not checkedAnti-Takeover Statutes, Shareholders, Stakeholders and Risk, 51 LA
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedAs Winter points out, "[u]nlike the case of laws permitting embezzlement, the competition between states for charters may provide inadequate protection in the case of takeover statutes. . . . [There is] a case for federal regulation protecting competition in the market for management control
no DOI — not checkedCorporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters
no DOI — not checkedat 1184; see also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedAs Bebchuk and Ferrell argue, however, if anti-takeover statutes were mere "flukes" in an otherwise well-functioning theory of corporate federalism, we would not see the ongoing, deliberate steps leading to these statutes by both managers and state officials, who have had more than twenty years to adjust, if they felt the statutes problematic. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 121, at 1198. Separately, there is the argument that Delaware's relatively mild 130 I do not mean to suggest that corporate scholars have disregard this facet of corporate governance
no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedThe Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO
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no DOI — not checkedIn the basic public choice account, regulatory "goods" are subject to supply and demand in a marketplace characterized by the self-interested behavior of legislatures, regulators and agencies, interest groups, and citizens
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no DOI — not checkedMandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA
no DOI — not checkedShirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System
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no DOI — not checked); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law
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What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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