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Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1107509
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42/42 checkable references clean · checked 2026-10-08

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

9 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 42 checked references that resolve
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Distributive Politics and Economic Growth
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Colonial Heritage and Economic Development
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The Free-Market Innovation Machine
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Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana
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Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution
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The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?
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Trade, Growth, and Poverty
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Land Inequality and the Origin of Divergence and Overtaking in the Growth Process: Theory and Evidence
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Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies
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INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
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Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
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Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
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The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedWhy not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict
no DOI — not checkedWhy Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective
no DOI — not checkedInstitutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. Prepared for the Handbook of Economic Growth
no DOI — not checkedCan Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior within Multiple Games
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no DOI — not checkedThe Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Economic Rigidities
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What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. If Crossref’s record marks the work itself retracted, withdrawn, or removed, the badge says so instead of showing clean. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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