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Why Are Firms Unlevered?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1107839
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62/62 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 62 checked references that resolve
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Figure 1: Map of China, showing the observed species richness for vascular plants (dark and light represent high and low richness levels, respectively).
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedCorporate income taxes and the cost of capital: A correction
no DOI — not checkedCredit rationing in markets with imperfect information
no DOI — not checkedIncentive effects of terminations: Applications to the credit and labor markets
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