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Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1112030
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43/43 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-26

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

14 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 43 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2077833
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence
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Does Inflation Targeting Matter?
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Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
resolves10.1111/1467-6419.00131
Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence
resolves10.2139/ssrn.404880
The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes Since 1990: Evidence from De Facto Policies
resolves10.1111/1468-5965.00159
Alice in Euroland
resolves10.1111/1467-9957.00365
Does monetary policy transparency reduce disinflation costs?
resolves10.5089/9781451865165.001
Goal-Independent Central Banks
resolves10.5089/9781451865493.001
Testing the Transparency Benefits of Inflation Targeting
resolves10.1257/jep.21.4.69
The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World
resolves10.1515/jeeh-1992-0410
CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
resolves10.1111/1467-9957.00366
The inflation bias revisited: theory and some international evidence
resolves10.1016/s0304-3932(01)00107-6
Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies—an international perspective
resolves10.1093/wber/9.3.397
Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence
resolves10.1093/wber/6.3.353
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
resolves10.3386/w13003
Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?
resolves10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.04.001
Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set
resolves10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.09.013
How transparent are central banks?
resolves10.1111/1468-2354.00114
Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00082
Central Bank Transparency
resolves10.1093/cesifo/ifj004
Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice
resolves10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00359.x
Is the MPC's Voting Record Informative about Future UK Monetary Policy?
resolves10.2307/1344630
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
resolves10.2307/422090
The Politics of Central Bank Independence
resolves10.1016/S0378-4266(99)00084-9
Does central bank independence really matter?
resolves10.1016/s0176-2680(98)00006-8
Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability
resolves10.1111/1468-5965.00175
The Eurosystem: Transparent andAccountable or ‘Willem in Euroland’
resolves10.5089/9781451860948.001
Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean
resolves10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00181-2
The effect of inflation targeting on the behavior of expected inflation: evidence from an 11 country panel
resolves10.1596/1813-9450-4012
Governance Matters V: Aggregate And Individual Governance Indicators For 1996 - 2005
resolves10.1017/s0003055403000777
The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6419.2009.00597.x
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS
resolves10.1086/260580
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
resolves10.1017/s0043887100012867
Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02138.x
Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve
resolves10.1257/000282802762024610
Social Value of Public Information
resolves10.1257/000282806776157597
Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con: Reply
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.08.002
The strategy of professional forecasting☆
resolves10.2307/1885679
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
resolves10.3386/t0284
Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression
resolves10.1257/000282806776157650
Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1001232
Is Transparency to No Avail? Committee Decision-Making, Pre-Meetings, and Credible Deals
resolves10.1111/j.1475-4991.1988.tb00558.x
A NEW SET OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF REAL PRODUCT AND PRICE LEVELS ESTIMATES FOR 130 COUNTRIES, 1950–1985
The 14 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedref7
no DOI — not checkedHow Do Central Banks Talk?
no DOI — not checkedDoes It Pay To Be Transparent? International Evidence from Central Bank Forecasts
no DOI — not checkedHow Independent Should Central Banks Be?
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedThe Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence. Special Papers in International Economics 19
no DOI — not checkedCentral Bank Independence Revisited
no DOI — not checkedKey Issues in the Choice of Monetary Policy Framework
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedWhy Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There Is No Institutional Fix for Politics
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Contracts for Central Bankers
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