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Incentive Compensation and the Likelihood of Termination: Theory and Evidence from Real Estate Organizations

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1122548
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1 of 41 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

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References needing attention

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The 40 checked references that resolve
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CREARAR v. HARCOAN
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe Dynamics of Quality Settingvand Reputation: The Case of Real Estate Limited Partnerships
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedExecutive Compensation
no DOI — not checkedChanging General Partners in Your RELP
no DOI — not checkedHow Leo Wells Built Vast Empire of Towers on Unusual Foundation
no DOI — not checkedIncentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets
no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedref49
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