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Asymmetric Behavioral Effects of Informal Sanction and Reward on Cooperation in an Experimental Public Good Game

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1125454
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7 of 43 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-10-12

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1037//1089-2680.5.4.323
does not resolve to a known work10.1007/bf01669207
does not resolve to a known work10.1037//0033-2909.128.5.774
does not resolve to a known work10.1037//0022-3514.75.4.887
does not resolve to a known work10.1037//0033-2909.110.1.67
does not resolve to a known work10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199607)26:4<557::aid-ejsp769>3.3.co;2-w
does not resolve to a known work10.1037//0022-3514.51.1.110
The 36 checked references that resolve
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Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
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Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments
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Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments
resolves10.1111/1468-0475.00080
The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.011
Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011
Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment
resolves10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0
Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.003
The framing of games and the psychology of play
resolves10.2139/ssrn.897100
Nonmonetary Sanctions and Rewards in an Experimental Coordination Game
resolves10.2139/ssrn.191392
The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00047-x
Institutional framing: Some experimental evidence
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x
Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
resolves10.1257/aer.90.1.247
A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
resolves10.1257/aer.90.4.980
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
resolves10.1177/0022002788032001008
The Effects of Decision Framing and Others' Behavior on Cooperation in a Social Dilemma
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00045-1
Collective action as a social exchange
resolves10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.303
Social Learning and Voluntary Cooperation among like-Minded People
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.008
Disposition, history and contributions in public goods experiments
resolves10.1016/0047-2727(85)90038-6
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01519.x
COMMUNICATION and FREE‐RIDING BEHAVIOR: THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM
resolves10.1037//0022-3514.66.3.513
Communication, commitment, and cooperation in social dilemma.
resolves10.1002/per.420
Individual differences in cooperation in a circular public goods game
resolves10.1177/0146167204264004
The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves
resolves10.2307/1290070
The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms
resolves10.2307/3312904
Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?
resolves10.2139/ssrn.764185
Punishment and Counter-Punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Still Govern Ourselves?
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.018
The ecology of collective action: A public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation
resolves10.2307/1964229
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00128-1
Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing effects on free-riding
resolves10.1016/s0144-8188(99)00013-7
Creating and enforcing norms, with special reference to sanctions
resolves10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00021-5
The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations
resolves10.1207/s15327957pspr0504_2
Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00042-5
Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00177-9
Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution
resolves10.1023/A:1026277420119
Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedWhy Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedA Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedPublic goods: a survey of experimental research
no DOI — not checkedMonetary and non-monetary punishment in the VCM
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedref47
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. If Crossref’s record marks the work itself retracted, withdrawn, or removed, the badge says so instead of showing clean. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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