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Semi-Collusive Advertising and Pricing in Experimental Duopolies

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1161076
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26/26 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 26 checked references that resolve
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Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets
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Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets
resolves10.1007/bf01024307
Price communications in a multimarket context: An experimental investigation
resolves10.1257/00028280260344704
R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence from Belgium
resolves10.2307/2552919
Advertising and the Theory of Entry Barriers
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00042-6
Advance production and Cournot outcomes: an experimental investigation
resolves10.1093/joclec/nhm016
HOW MUCH COLLUSION? A META-ANALYSIS OF OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS
resolves10.2307/2555385
Capital Investments and Price Agreements in Semicollusive Markets
resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02126.x
Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion: Experimental Evidence
resolves10.1515/9780691213255-007
5. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research
resolves10.1016/0165-1765(90)90136-o
The effects of non-binding price announcements on posted-offer markets
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2002.10.002
Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies
resolves10.1287/mksc.22.1.85.12842
Internet Shopping Agents: Virtual Co-Location and Competition
resolves10.1016/S0167-7187(01)00074-1
An empirical test of models explaining research expenditures and research cooperation: evidence for the German service sector
resolves10.1086/260996
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.008
A laboratory study of advertising and price competition
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2004.07.005
An experimental study of price dispersion
resolves10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00091-8
Quantity precommitment in an experimental oligopoly market
resolves10.1007/s001910050074
An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game
resolves10.1086/260231
Advertising as Information
resolves10.2307/2296903
Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion
resolves10.1086/261031
Economies of Scale and Barriers to Entry
resolves10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00051-8
Semicollusion in the Norwegian cement market
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.002
Does R&D cooperation facilitate price collusion? An experiment
resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9132-2
Bertrand colludes more than Cournot
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedCooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spill-overs
no DOI — not checkedThe effect of advertising on competition: A survey
no DOI — not checkedAn online recruitment system for economic experiments
no DOI — not checkedResearch joint venture and R&D cartels
no DOI — not checkedProduct differentiation advantages of pioneering brands
no DOI — not checkedEnd behavior in finite prisoners dilemma supergames
no DOI — not checkedA model of sales
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