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Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1168762
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49/49 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

25 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 49 checked references that resolve
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On the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators
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Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control
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A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs
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Bargaining in Legislatures
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A Dynamic Model of Multidimensional Collective Choice
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Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis
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A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt
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Taking Personalities Out of Monetary Policy Decision Making? Interactions, Heterogeneity and Committee Decisions in the Bank of England's MPC
resolves10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.01.003
Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?
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Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium
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Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy
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Minimizing multimodal functions of continuous variables with the “simulated annealing” algorithm—Corrigenda for this article is available here
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Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility
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Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making
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Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining?
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.x
Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.026
Too little, too late: Interest rate setting and the costs of consensus
resolves10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00248.x
Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC
resolves10.1016/0167-2231(91)90002-m
Interest rates and the conduct of monetary policy
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The Optimal Design of Interest Rate Target Changes
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A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
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Estimating the Value of Proposal Power
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Anti-herding and strategic consultation
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The FOMC: Preferences, Voting, and Consensus
resolves10.1016/s0304-3932(03)00027-8
Monetary policy evaluation with noisy information
resolves10.1353/eca.2003.0007
Robust Monetary Policy Rules with Unknown Natural Rates
resolves10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.091007.122139
Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy
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Comparative Politics and Public Finance
resolves10.1002/9780470996249.ch14
Nonnested Hypothesis Testing: An Overview
resolves10.1086/262055
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1548069
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees
resolves10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00144.x
The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1168762
Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?
resolves10.1007/bf03187594
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
resolves10.2307/1909447
A Statistical Model of Friction in Economics
resolves10.3386/w6618
Interest-Rate Rules in an Estimated Sticky Price Model
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Federal Reserve interest rate targeting, rational expectations, and the term structure
resolves10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00149-6
Term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia
resolves10.1353/mcb.2003.0038
Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences
resolves10.1016/s0304-3932(00)00019-2
Does the fed act gradually? A VAR analysis
resolves10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00078-6
Open-economy inflation targeting
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How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory, and Evidence from the FOMC
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Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods
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A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank
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Policy Boards and Policy Smoothing*
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Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing
The 25 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe Bank of Israel
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedThe Quiet Revolution: Central Banking Goes Modern
no DOI — not checkedAre Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedKey Issues in the Choice of Monetary Policy Framework
no DOI — not checkedCentral Bankers and Uncertainty
no DOI — not checkedWhy do the Monetary Authorities Smooth Interest Rates
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedAn Experimental Test of a Stochastic Game Model of Committee Bargaining
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedPolicy Rules for In ?atin Targeting
no DOI — not checkedref64
no DOI — not checkedOptimal In ?ation Targeting: Further Developments of In ?ation Targeting
no DOI — not checkedA Bayesian Approach to Real Estate Assessment
no DOI — not checkedref73
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