Reference health

Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1310191
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27/27 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI or an arXiv id in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

6 with no DOI or arXiv id: not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is checked only when it names an arXiv id, under that id’s DataCite DOI. The rest are never matched by title or guessed at; they stay outside the checked set, and this line says so.

The 27 checked references that resolve
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Comment on James J. Heckman, "Instrumental Variables: A Study of Implicit Behavioral Assumptions Used in Making Program Evaluations"
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PRACTITIONERS’ CORNER: Computing Robust Standard Errors for Within‐groups Estimators <sup>*</sup>
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Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
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Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives
resolves10.1002/hec.1291
Use of instrumental variables in the presence of heterogeneity and self‐selection: an application to treatments of breast cancer patients
resolves10.1162/003355304772839588
How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?
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The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care
resolves10.1016/s1573-4463(99)03008-4
Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches
resolves10.1086/209828
The Effect of Incentive Policies on the Practice Location of Doctors: A Multinomial Probit Analysis
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511610240.005
Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work
resolves10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00074-8
Do doctors respond to financial incentives? UK family doctors and the GP fundholder scheme
resolves10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.05.006
Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of Canadian family physicians
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1056141
Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment
resolves10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.09.001
Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment
resolves10.2307/27917249
Policy Analysis in the Health-Services Market: Accounting for Quality and Quantity
resolves10.2307/2556008
Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships
resolves10.2307/2555794
Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery
resolves10.1017/ccol0521340446.003
The theory of contracts
resolves10.1257/aer.91.2.107
Policy-Relevant Treatment Effects
resolves10.3386/w6426
General Equilibrium Treatment Effects: A Study of Tuition Policy
resolves10.1056/nejm198907133210205
How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?
resolves10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
resolves10.1002/9783527611294.ch7
Physician Payment Mechanisms
resolves10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00093.x
H<scp>ealth</scp> C<scp>are</scp> P<scp>ayment</scp> S<scp>ystems</scp>: C<scp>ost and</scp> Q<scp>uality</scp> I<scp>ncentives</scp>
resolves10.1111/1468-2354.00055
Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records
resolves10.1086/261673
The Rational Nonpurchase of Long-Term-Care Insurance
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.002
New evidence on earnings and benefit claims following changes in the retirement earnings test in 2000
The 6 references with no DOI or arXiv id, listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedMethod of physician remuneration and rates of antiobitic prescription
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedOptimal health insurance and provider payment
no DOI — not checkedref28
no DOI — not checkedReimbursing health plans and health providers: Efficiency in production versus selection
no DOI — not checkedref33
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. If Crossref’s record marks the work itself retracted, withdrawn, or removed, the badge says so instead of showing clean. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references with neither a DOI nor an arXiv id.

checked 2026-08-27 — re-checked at most once a day, when someone opens this page, so the date shown is the last check; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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