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Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs. Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1360897
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1 of 20 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-27

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1017/s0003055400189580
The 19 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.0082
Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
resolves10.1093/pan/mpi013
Duverger's Hypothesis, the Run-Off Rule, and Electoral Competition
resolves10.1162/154247603770383433
Why Vote for Losers?
resolves10.1080/00220388.2017.1414184
Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities
resolves10.1017/CBO9781139174954
Making Votes Count
resolves10.3386/w12922
Do Voters Vote Sincerely?
resolves10.2307/2111355
A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout
resolves10.2307/2952264
Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1567436
Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection
resolves10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.001
Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice
resolves10.2307/1912767
Sequential Equilibria
resolves10.1162/qjec.122.1.159
Does Head Start Improve Children's Life Chances? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design
resolves10.2139/ssrn.838085
Robust Political Equilibria Under Plurality and Runoff Rule
resolves10.2139/ssrn.142035
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00421.x
On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
resolves10.2307/2938959
A Theory of Voting Equilibria
resolves10.2307/2946658
A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
resolves10.3386/w10176
How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?
resolves10.1007/bf00149243
Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates
The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedThe Double Ballot as a weapon against Anti system Parties
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref25
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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