Reference health

Experimental Asset Markets with Endogenous Choice of Costly Heterogeneous Information

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1399359
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13/13 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-24

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

3 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 13 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1086/296567
The Market Value of Information: Some Experimental Results
resolves10.2307/2325486
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work
resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01907.x
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATION
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(82)90005-9
Rational expectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices: A mean-variance example
resolves10.1016/j.jedc.2006.09.003
‘J’-shaped returns to timing advantage in access to information – Experimental evidence and a tentative explanation
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.012
Is more information always better?
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(78)90025-9
Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency
resolves10.1016/j.jedc.2008.08.002
Underreaction to fundamental information and asymmetry in mispricing between bullish and bearish markets. An experimental study
resolves10.1086/261670
Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?
resolves10.2307/2951588
Market for Information: Experimental Evidence
resolves10.2307/1913389
Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedForschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003, An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedOn the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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