Reference health

Integrated Political Strategy

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1411706
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81/81 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-17

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

20 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 81 checked references that resolve
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Campaign Contributions and Access
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Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
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Counteractive Lobbying
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The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
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Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium
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Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics
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Basic Interests
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A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
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Lobbying Legislatures
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Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy
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Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? A Model of Venue Choice
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Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests Supreme Court Nominations, and United States Senate
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Veto Bargaining
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Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts
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Strategic Information Transmission
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Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals
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Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation
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Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes
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Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence
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The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation
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Congress and the political expansion of the U.S. districts courts
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When do firms hire lobbyists? The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
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Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying
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Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary
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The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission
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An informational perspective on administrative procedures
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Advocates
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Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
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A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy
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Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions
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Politically Connected Firms
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Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
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Estimating the Value of Political Connections
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Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation
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Much of Politics Is Still Local: Multi‐State Lobbying in State Interest Communities
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Buying Supermajorities
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Protection For Sale
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Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
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Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
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Politics and Funding in the U.S. Public Biomedical R&D System
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Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda
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Corporate political strategies and firm performance: indications of firm-specific benefits from personal service in the U.S. government
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Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions
resolves10.2307/20141860
Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law
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Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy
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A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action
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A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policy Making: Grove City College v. Bell
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Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies
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Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation
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Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court
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Bribes and Fruit Baskets: What Does the Link Between PAC Contributions and Lobbying Mean?
resolves10.1007/bf00149180
Lobbying and asymmetric information
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Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit
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Interest-Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond the Political Disadvantage Theory
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Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
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Litigation Versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent-Seekers
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To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law
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CORPORATE POLITICAL STRATEGY AND FOREIGN COMPETITION: THE CASE OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY.
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PURSUING STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS: A MULTIVARIATE APPROACH.
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Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts
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The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
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Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986
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ON BUYING LEGISLATURES*
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Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often
resolves10.2307/2111431
Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals
resolves10.1086/467200
Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed"
resolves10.1016/0895-7177(92)90095-3
Agency discretion under judicial review
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Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988
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E<scp>conomic</scp> A<scp>nalysis and</scp> M<scp>anagement</scp> S<scp>trategy</scp>: A S<scp>urvey</scp> C<scp>ontinued</scp>
resolves10.2307/3003160
The Theory of Economic Regulation
resolves10.1086/261833
Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees
resolves10.1086/467385
The Market For Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023393
Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making
resolves10.2307/1123600
A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice
resolves10.1093/jleo/15.2.349
Strategic instruments: legal structure and political games in administrative law
resolves10.1086/261528
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
resolves10.1086/261181
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedThe Pharmaceutical Industry
no DOI — not checkedBudget of the United States Government. Fiscal Year 2009. Government Printing Office
no DOI — not checkedref51
no DOI — not checkedLitigation and Settlement
no DOI — not checkedDynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for
no DOI — not checkedAdministrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
no DOI — not checkedCongressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols v. Fire Alarms
no DOI — not checkedRaising Rivals' Costs
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no DOI — not checkedref80
no DOI — not checkedJudicial Choice of Legal Doctrines
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