Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction,
withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 81 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2111575Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes
resolves10.2307/2111488The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
resolves10.2307/2937834Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium
resolves10.1515/bap.1999.1.1.7Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics
resolves10.2307/1886017A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
resolves10.2307/2991768Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests Supreme Court Nominations, and United States Senate
resolves10.2307/797418Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals
resolves10.2139/ssrn.694923Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation
resolves10.3386/w17171Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes
resolves10.1093/icc/dth035When do firms hire lobbyists? The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
resolves10.1086/467355Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary
resolves10.1162/105864001300122566The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission
resolves10.2307/2111603Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
resolves10.2307/796805Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions
resolves10.3386/w4877Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
resolves10.2307/1962767Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
resolves10.2307/20141860Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law
resolves10.2307/2939043A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action
resolves10.1093/jleo/ews010A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policy Making: Grove City College v. Bell
resolves10.2307/1073179Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies
resolves10.2307/1191982Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation
resolves10.2307/2938746Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court
resolves10.2307/1073657Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit
resolves10.2307/2131830Interest-Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond the Political Disadvantage Theory
resolves10.2307/1372738To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law
resolves10.2307/256661CORPORATE POLITICAL STRATEGY AND FOREIGN COMPETITION: THE CASE OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY.
resolves10.2307/3069303PURSUING STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS: A MULTIVARIATE APPROACH.
resolves10.2307/2952257Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts
resolves10.1086/261731Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986
resolves10.1086/467243Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often
resolves10.2307/2111431Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals
resolves10.1086/467200Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed"
resolves10.2307/2555900Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988
resolves10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00355.xE<scp>conomic</scp> A<scp>nalysis and</scp> M<scp>anagement</scp> S<scp>trategy</scp>: A S<scp>urvey</scp> C<scp>ontinued</scp>
resolves10.1086/261833Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees
resolves10.1086/467385The Market For Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?
resolves10.1093/jleo/15.2.349Strategic instruments: legal structure and political games in administrative law
resolves10.1086/261528The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
resolves10.1086/261181Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedref14
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedThe Pharmaceutical Industry
no DOI — not checkedBudget of the United States Government. Fiscal Year 2009. Government Printing Office
no DOI — not checkedref51
no DOI — not checkedLitigation and Settlement
no DOI — not checkedDynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for
no DOI — not checkedAdministrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
no DOI — not checkedCongressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols v. Fire Alarms
no DOI — not checkedRaising Rivals' Costs
no DOI — not checkedref75
no DOI — not checkedref80
no DOI — not checkedJudicial Choice of Legal Doctrines
no DOI — not checkedref92
no DOI — not checkedref95
no DOI — not checkedref99
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