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Collusion under Payoff Fluctuations

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1420822
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17/17 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 17 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1
Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
resolves10.2307/2555941
Collusion over the Business Cycle
resolves10.2307/2555490
Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00082.x
Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations
resolves10.2307/2555852
Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee
resolves10.2307/2296617
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
resolves10.2307/1911462
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
resolves10.2307/2601009
The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior
resolves10.2307/2298053
Correlated Demand Shocks and Price Wars During Booms
resolves10.1257/002205106776162681
What Determines Cartel Success?
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001
Repeated Games and Reputations
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511804038
Competition Policy
resolves10.2307/3003634
A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886
resolves10.3386/w1412
A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms
resolves10.1016/0014-2921(90)90125-i
Strategic pricing models and interpretation of price-war data
resolves10.1016/0899-8256(91)90035-d
The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
resolves10.2307/2555984
Collusive Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty
The 1 reference without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedCooperation under Stochastic Outside Options
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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