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Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1430947
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40/40 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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