Reference health

Firms in Economic Distress: Survival Strategies and Economic Factors

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1465181
CiteStamped reference-health badge
1 of 44 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-19

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.2307/2329497
The 43 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.010
Law, finance, and economic growth in China
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00567
Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
resolves10.1596/1813-9450-4465
Formal Versus Informal Finance : Evidence From China
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00727.x
Financial and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?
resolves10.3386/w8982
Industry Growth and Capital Allocation: Does Having a Market- or Bank-Based System Matter?
resolves10.1086/467167
Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises
resolves10.1016/s0927-5398(02)00023-3
Resolution of corporate distress in East Asia
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.010
Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00086-1
Does Delaware law improve firm value?
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00084
Law, Finance, and Firm Growth
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00055-0
Managerial discipline and corporate restructuring following performance declines
resolves10.1257/aer.91.1.320
State-Owned and Privately Owned Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00183-1
Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more?
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.x
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.008
Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms☆
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1102859
Distress Without Bankruptcy: An Emerging Market Perspective
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(89)90083-4
Management turnover and financial distress
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(96)00900-2
Vulture investors and the market for control of distressed firms
resolves10.1016/0272-6963(95)00011-g
The impact of just‐in‐time manufacturing on firm performance in the US
resolves10.2139/ssrn.99580
Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
resolves10.2139/ssrn.146149
Eclipse of the Public Corporation
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03999.x
The Voluntary Restructuring of Large Firms In Response to Performance Decline
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.12.040
Financial distress, corporate control, and management turnover
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00024-x
Corporate restructuring during performance declines in Japan
resolves10.2307/2118406
Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right
resolves10.2307/2171739
Estimation of a Panel Data Sample Selection Model
resolves10.1086/250042
Law and Finance
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00065-9
Investor protection and corporate governance
resolves10.1515/9783866537149.6.349
MODEL LAW OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00573
Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04625.x
Stock Markets, Growth, and Tax Policy
resolves10.2307/2601259
The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth
resolves10.1596/1813-9450-1690
Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-c
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05147.x
The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00003-2
The decline of takeovers and disciplinary managerial turnover
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00076-4
A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis
resolves10.3386/w2532
Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6288.1998.tb01367.x
An empirical comparison of bankruptcy models
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(93)90038-d
Capital structure and firm response to poor performance
resolves10.3386/w5758
Financial Dependence and Growth
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00145-4
China share issue privatization: the extent of its success
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02585.x
The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedCorporate financial structure and managerial incentives
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-19 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1465181"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1465181/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1465181/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1465181)