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Inequity and Risk Aversion in Sequential Public Good Games

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1477278
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 29 checked references that resolve
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Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: Evidence from linear public goods games
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Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation
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Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
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The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedAn Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
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