Reference health
Materiality Judgments and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements: The Role of Managers, Auditors, and Audit Committees
72/72 checkable references clean · checked 2026-10-12
Every reference with a DOI or an arXiv id in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
13 with no DOI or arXiv id: not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is checked only when it names an arXiv id, under that id’s DataCite DOI. The rest are never matched by title or guessed at; they stay outside the checked set, and this line says so.
The 72 checked references that resolve
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Do Nonaudit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2011.00405.x
Discussion of Why Do EPS Forecast Error and Dispersion Not Vary with Scale? Implications for Analyst and Managerial Behavior
resolves10.2308/accr.2004.79.2.277
Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Planning and Pricing Decisions
resolves10.1506/u818-caad-mxbe-fxma
The Disposition of Audit‐Detected Misstatements: An Examination of Risk and Reward Factors and Aggregation Effects*
resolves10.2308/acch.2003.17.2.153
Could $51 Million Be Immaterial When Enron Reports Income of $105 Million?
resolves10.2308/accr.2005.80.2.423
A Temporal Analysis of Quarterly Earnings Thresholds: Propensities and Valuation Consequences
resolves10.2308/acch.2006.20.4.351
Audit Committee Financial Experts: A Closer Examination Using Firm Designations
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2010.00387.x
Why Do EPS Forecast Error and Dispersion Not Vary with Scale? Implications for Analyst and Managerial Behavior
resolves10.1177/0148558X0902400103
Earnings Restatements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Disciplining of Chief Financial Officers
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01026.x
Corporate Governance in the Post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley Era: Auditors’ Experiences*
resolves10.2308/accr.2006.81.1.83
The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover
resolves10.1016/j.aos.2005.09.001
Accountability and auditors’ materiality judgments: The effects of differential pressure strength on conservatism, variability, and effort
resolves10.1506/tfvv-uyt1-nnyt-1yfh
Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*
resolves10.2308/accr.2003.78.3.707
Earnings Predictability and the Direction of Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.009
Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors
resolves10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.71
The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management
resolves10.2308/aud.2003.22.2.53
Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Auditor Reporting on Stressed Companies
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00302.x
Client Characteristics and the Negotiation Tactics of Auditors: Implications for Financial Reporting
resolves10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00018-0
Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature
resolves10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
resolves10.2308/accr.2001.76.2.199
Engagement Planning, Bid Pricing, and Client Response in the Market for Initial Attest Engagements
resolves10.2308/acch.2001.15.1.1
Antecedents and Consequences of Independence Risk: Framework for Analysis
resolves10.2308/acch.2009.23.1.19
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 108 Disclosures: Descriptive Evidence from the Revelation of Accounting Misstatements
resolves10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.107
Discussion of The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679X.2004.t01-1-00141.x
Auditor Independence, Non‐Audit Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?*
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.t01-1-00143.x
Fees Paid to Audit Firms, Accrual Choices, and Corporate Governance
resolves10.2308/accr.2000.75.4.383
Does Mandated Audit Communication Reduce Opportunistic Corrections to Manage Earnings to Forecasts?
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00266.x
Non‐audit Service Fees and Audit Quality: The Impact of Auditor Specialization
resolves10.2308/accr.2001.76.3.313
The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings Benchmark on the CEO's Annual Bonus
resolves10.2308/aud.2005.24.2.153
A Review and Integration of Empirical Research on Materiality: Two Decades Later
resolves10.1108/14757700910980840
The association between audit fees and reported earnings quality in pre‐ and post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley regimes
resolves10.2308/accr.2003.78.3.779
Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation?
resolves10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.175
Evidence from Auditors about Managers' and Auditors' Earnings Management Decisions
resolves10.1506/car.24.4.5
Effects of Qualitative Factor Salience, Expressed Client Concern, and Qualitative Materiality Thresholds on Auditors' Audit Adjustment Decisions*
resolves10.2308/aud.2007.26.1.71
Auditors' Decisions on Audit Differences that Affect Significant Earnings Thresholds
resolves10.1177/1536867x0400400206
Computing Interaction Effects and Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models
resolves10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00010-6
Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions
resolves10.2308/accr.2007.82.1.241
The Effect of Auditors' Use of a Reciprocity-Based Strategy on Auditor-Client Negotiations
resolves10.2308/accr.2005.80.1.349
Auditor Negotiations: An Examination of the Efficacy of Intervention Methods
resolves10.1177/0148558x9701200102
<b>An Examination of Factors Affecting the Decision to Waive Audit Adjustments</b>
The 13 references with no DOI or arXiv id, listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedA model of the market for MAS and audit services: Knowledge spillovers and auditor-auditee bonding
no DOI — not checkedStatement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedA review and integration of empirical research on materiality
no DOI — not checkedInteraction Effects in Logistic Regression
no DOI — not checkedref58
no DOI — not checkedref59
no DOI — not checkedref62
no DOI — not checkedAudit pricing and independence
no DOI — not checkedThe effect of quantitative materiality approach on auditors' adjustment decisions
no DOI — not checkedConsidering the effects of prior year misstatements when quantifying misstatements in current year financial statements
no DOI — not checkedref82
no DOI — not checkedUsing financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors
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