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An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1533488
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The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedMarriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting
no DOI — not checkedThe Formation and Dissultion of Families: Why Marry? Who Marries Whom? and What Happens upon Divorce
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