Reference health

Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1538738
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24/24 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

4 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 24 checked references that resolve
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A model of physician behaviour with demand inducement
resolves10.1002/hec.603
The physician–patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission
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Revisiting the Most Informed Consumer of Surgical Services: <i>The Physician-Patient</i>
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DEMAND INDUCEMENT AND THE PHYSICIAN/PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
resolves10.1257/002205106776162717
On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods
resolves10.1162/00335530360698423
Bad Reputation
resolves10.2307/2555942
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts
resolves10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00023-5
Credence goods monopolists
resolves10.1016/0167-6296(86)90007-x
Theories of the price and quantity of physician services
resolves10.1377/hlthaff.20.2.186
Patients’ Attitudes Toward Cost Control Bonuses For Managed Care Physicians
resolves10.1016/s0167-6296(99)00009-0
Physician fees and procedure intensity: the case of cesarean delivery
resolves10.1056/nejm199811193392106
Primary Care Physicians' Experience of Financial Incentives in Managed-Care Systems
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(85)90059-6
The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables
resolves10.3790/schm.129.2.297
Health Insurance Status and Physician Behavior in Germany
resolves10.1016/0167-6296(94)90036-1
A re-examination of the meaning and importance of supplier-induced demand
resolves10.1016/S1574-0064(00)80168-7
Physician Agency
resolves10.7326/0003-4819-150-4-200902170-00008
Much Ado About (Doing) Nothing
resolves10.1111/1468-0009.00202
Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives
resolves10.1111/j.0022-4367.2005.00119.x
<scp>Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods</scp>
resolves10.1016/0277-9536(82)90234-9
Professional uncertainty and the problem of supplier-induced demand
The 4 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedThe Credence Good Problem and the Organization of Health Care Markets
no DOI — not checkedref26
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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