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Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games: An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1544883
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1 of 49 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

15 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

References needing attention

does not resolve to a known work10.1162/105864097567039
The 48 checked references that resolve
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Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
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Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U. S. Trucking
resolves10.1257/aer.90.4.1034
Learning and Forgetting: The Dynamics of Aircraft Production
resolves10.2307/2951571
Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry
resolves10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03029-9
Chapter 29 Empirical Models of Entry and Market Structure
resolves10.2307/2297815
Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance
resolves10.1086/261786
Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets
resolves10.2307/2098317
Vertical Integration in Competitive Markets Under Uncertainty
resolves10.2307/2534790
Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry
resolves10.2307/2696387
On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6427.2006.00276.x
DOES ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AFFECT INVESTMENT DECISIONS?*
resolves10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.04.008
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resolves10.3982/ecta5368
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resolves10.2307/2290321
A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games
resolves10.1111/1467-6451.00166
Market size and vertical integration: Stigler’s hypothesis reconsidered
resolves10.3386/w13069
Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration
resolves10.1057/palgrave.jgm.4940048
M&A Strategy within the Generic Pharmaceuticals Sector: Vertical Integration into Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients
resolves10.1086/467257
Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act
resolves10.1086/261404
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
resolves10.2307/2534783
Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2005.00266.x
MARKET POWER, VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND THE WHOLESALE PRICE OF GASOLINE*
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00241.x
A THEORY OF BILATERAL OLIGOPOLY
resolves10.1057/palgrave.jgm.4940047
Global Generics Profitability: Increasing Need for Business Development and Licensing
resolves10.1086/514347
Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices
resolves10.3982/ecta6649
What Happens When Wal-Mart Comes to Town: An Empirical Analysis of the Discount Retailing Industry
resolves10.1257/jel.45.3.629
Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence
resolves10.1377/hlthaff.20.5.241
Are The Benefits Of Newer Drugs Worth Their Cost? Evidence From The 1996 MEPS
resolves10.1057/palgrave.jgm.4940019
Protection and Challenge of Pharmaceutical Patents
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.07.002
Predicting the impact of upstream mergers on downstream markets with an application to the retail gasoline industry
resolves10.2307/2696364
Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets
resolves10.2307/3087431
Product Choice and Oligopoly Market Structure
resolves10.2139/ssrn.950205
Vertical Mergers, Foreclosure and Raising Rivals' Costs - Experimental Evidence
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.015
Efficient entry
resolves10.1162/0034653053327694
Generic Drug Industry Dynamics
resolves10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03033-0
Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure
resolves10.3386/w11431
Generic Scrip Share and the Price of Brand-Name Drugs: The Role of the Consumer
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1994.tb01331.x
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ON VERTICAL FORECLOSURE
resolves10.2307/1885117
Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure
resolves10.2307/2556056
Entry Decisions in the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00034.x
An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product-type choices
resolves10.1057/palgrave.jgm.4950062
FTC Review of Generic Drug Mergers — Four Recent Consents Provide Significant Guidance on Mode of Analysis and Divestiture Requirements
resolves10.1057/palgrave.jgm.4940132
The Evolution of the Global Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Supply Market and the Impact on the Generic Pharmaceuticals Business in the United States
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.12.003
Market foreclosure and vertical merger: A case study of the vertical merger between Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00240
Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511753930
Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation
resolves10.1093/joclec/nhm030
USING RETAIL DATA FOR UPSTREAM MERGER ANALYSIS
resolves10.1016/s0167-7187(01)00085-6
Non-contractible investments and vertical integration in the Mexican footwear industry
The 15 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedWatson Sees Future in India
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedThe Medical Expenditure Panel Survey: A National Health Information System
no DOI — not checkedVertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedEquilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Reply
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedAnticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm
no DOI — not checkedEvaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post Chicago Approach
no DOI — not checkedMylan in India's Biggest Pharmaceutical Takeover as it Enters the Matrix
no DOI — not checkedEmpirical Studies of Vertical Foreclosure
no DOI — not checkedAnnual Report (Form 20-F). Financial statement
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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