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Intra-Firm Bargaining and Learning in a Market Equilibrium

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573476
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23/23 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-11

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The 23 checked references that resolve
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Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
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Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability
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Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders
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Information Sharing in Oligopoly
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00024.x
Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability
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Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory
resolves10.1257/mic.2.1.204
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.005
Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
resolves10.2139/ssrn.323762
International Benchmarking of Australian Telecommunications Services
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.0117
A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(88)90260-8
Optimal contracts with public ex post information
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(91)90064-b
Continuity in auction design
resolves10.1002/9781118267943
Investment Banking
resolves10.2307/2555560
A Theory of Yardstick Competition
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00409.x
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
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resolves10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00127.x
<scp>Interim Information in Long‐Term Contracts</scp>
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedIntra-Firm Bargaining and Learning in a Market Equilibrium
no DOI — not checkedref12
no DOI — not checkedA Theory of Holdouts in Wage Bargaining
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