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Monetary Policy and Excessive Bank Risk Taking

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573675
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34/34 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

15 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 34 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1266714
Financial Intermediaries, Financial Stability, and Monetary Policy
resolves10.1257/aer.99.2.600
Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1572798
Does Monetary Policy Affect Bank Risk-Taking?
resolves10.3386/w2015
Agency Costs, Collateral, and Business Fluctuations
resolves10.3386/w5146
Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission
resolves10.2307/2109844
The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality
resolves10.2139/ssrn.901387
Whither Monetary and Financial Stability? The Implications of Evolving Policy Regimes
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1334132
Capital Regulation, Risk-Taking and Monetary Policy: A Missing Link in the Transmission Mechanism?
resolves10.1257/jep.23.1.77
Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00085.x
DO CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS MATTER FOR MONETARY POLICY?
resolves10.1086/426038
Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy
resolves10.3386/w13502
Two Reasons Why Money and Credit May be Useful in Monetary Policy
resolves10.3386/w16402
Monetary Policy and Stock Market Booms
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1685125
Financial (In)Stability, Supervision and Liquidity Injections: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Approach
resolves10.5089/9781451869675.001
Credit Booms and Lending Standards
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhp033
Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
resolves10.1086/261155
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
resolves10.1257/000282806776157759
Money in a Theory of Banking
resolves10.3386/w14739
The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and Remedies
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.10.004
A model of unconventional monetary policy
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.06.009
Banking and interest rates in monetary policy analysis: A quantitative exploration
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042187
SHOULD THE FUNCTIONS OF MONETARY POLICY AND BANKING SUPERVISION BE SEPARATED?
resolves10.2139/ssrn.904255
Bank Failure Prediction: A Two-Step Survival Time Approach
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2004.04.002
Does monetary policy affect the central bank's role in bank supervision?
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1333538
Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say about the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking?
resolves10.1257/aer.90.3.407
What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say About the Transmission of Monetary Policy?
resolves10.1086/262072
Credit Cycles
resolves10.1086/260580
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
resolves10.3386/w13936
The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis
resolves10.5089/9781451874037.001
Countercyclical Macro Prudential Policies in a Supporting Role to Monetary Policy
resolves10.1162/003355399556098
Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?
resolves10.1111/j.1468-036x.2006.00330.x
Has Finance Made the World Riskier?
resolves10.3386/w14631
The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong
resolves10.1111/j.1538-4616.2007.00057.x
Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Crises
The 15 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedThe Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation
no DOI — not checkedref14
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedMoody's RiskCalc TM Model For Privately Held US Banks" Moody's Investors Service
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedChasing the Neutral Rate Down: Financial Conditions, Monetary Policy, and the Taylor Rule
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedDid Securitization Lead to Lax Screening
no DOI — not checkedMonetary Policy and the State of the Economy
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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