Reference health

The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from U.S. States

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1582347
CiteStamped reference-health badge
44/44 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

20 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 44 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1162/0033553041382148
Endogenous Political Institutions
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00032-6
Interaction terms in logit and probit models
resolves10.1023/A:1020583427467
The Impact of State Incentive Regulation on the U.S. Telecommunications Industry
resolves10.1007/s11149-004-7551-6
Incentive Regulation and Telecommunications Service Quality
resolves10.1016/j.jup.2004.07.008
Economic regulation of quality in electricity distribution networks
resolves10.2307/2298021
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
resolves10.1257/aer.97.1.169
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.06.004
Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks
resolves10.3386/w14143
Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections
resolves10.1007/s11149-008-9083-y
The political economy of state-level adoption of natural resource damage programs
resolves10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5
Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00312.x
PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND AGENCY COSTS <sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1007/s11149-008-9077-9
Technology and incentive regulation in the Italian motorways industry
resolves10.1162/154247603770383424
Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
resolves10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00185-2
Competition and the reform of incentive schemes in the regulated sector
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00085
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
resolves10.1007/s11127-005-3293-y
Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00155-1
Endogenous deregulation: evidence from OECD countries
resolves10.1007/s11149-006-0012-7
Incentive regulation in local telecommunications: The effects on price markups
resolves10.1017/s1074070800021866
Turning on the Lights: A Meta-Analysis of Residential Electricity Demand Elasticities
resolves10.1257/aer.97.4.1250
Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on US Electric Generation Efficiency
resolves10.2307/1593739
Regulatory Inertia
resolves10.1086/261826
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
resolves10.1162/003355305775097533
Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious Values
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1487509
Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory and Evidence
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1641098
The Political Economy of (De)Regulation: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. Electricity Market
resolves10.1257/0002828041464470
Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?
resolves10.1016/j.enpol.2007.06.022
Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: Lessons of experience from Britain
resolves10.1086/466794
Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation
resolves10.1177/1532673X02030003006
Ideology and Professionalism
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00280.x
THE ADOPTION OF STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATION: THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS*
resolves10.1016/0167-7187(95)00494-7
Industrial policy and politics
resolves10.1257/aer.99.3.572
Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies
resolves10.1257/aer.98.2.90
Using Tax Expenditures to Achieve Energy Policy Goals
resolves10.2307/1912346
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
resolves10.1016/1040-6190(92)90170-c
Naruc— The next generation
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00672
Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities: The Walras-Pareto Lectures
resolves10.7551/mitpress/2591.001.0001
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
resolves10.1177/1536867x0900900106
How to do Xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata
resolves10.1016/0167-6245(86)90002-8
Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy
resolves10.1023/b:rege.0000008655.66589.0e
The Market Response to Restructuring: A Behavioral Model
resolves10.2307/2534749
Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets
resolves10.1016/j.jeconom.2004.02.005
A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators
The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe State of PerformanceBased Regulation in the
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedEnergy Utility Pricing and Customer Response
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedIncentive Regulation for Electric Utilities
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedEvolution of Maines Electric Utility Industry, 1975-1995
no DOI — not checkedWhy a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences
no DOI — not checkedref51
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedref56
no DOI — not checkedRegulation in the States
no DOI — not checkedref60
no DOI — not checkedref61
no DOI — not checkedref62
no DOI — not checkedref63
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-27 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1582347"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1582347/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1582347/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1582347)