Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction,
withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 55 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/jel.48.1.58The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
resolves10.5465/amj.2006.23478165A Changing of the Guard: Executive and Director Turnover Following Corporate Financial Restatements
resolves10.2469/dig.v27.n2.79An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud
resolves10.2307/1600632Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
resolves10.2308/accr.2006.81.1.83The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01027.xThe Association Between Accruals Quality and the Characteristics of Accounting Experts and Mix of Expertise on Audit Committees*
resolves10.2307/256485POWER IN TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS: DIMENSIONS, MEASUREMENT, AND VALIDATION.
resolves10.1002/smj.907The role of technical expertise in firm governance structure: evidence from chief financial officer contractual incentives
resolves10.2307/2331203Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation
resolves10.1007/s11142-007-9046-zMarket reactions to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses and to the characteristics of those weaknesses under section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002
resolves10.2308/accr.2008.83.6.1487The Importance of Distinguishing Errors from Irregularities in Restatement Research: The Case of Restatements and CEO/CFO Turnover
resolves10.1287/orsc.1080.0355Directors' Multiple Identities, Identification, and Board Monitoring and Resource Provision
resolves10.2308/accr.2009.84.3.839Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting: A Comparison of Regulatory Regimes
resolves10.1007/s10551-010-0660-5Should Independent Board Members with Social Ties to Management Disqualify Themselves from Serving on the Board?
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2005.00172.xConsequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members
resolves10.1111/j.1475-679x.2010.00378.xIncreased Disclosure Requirements and Corporate Governance Decisions: Evidence from Chief Financial Officers in the Pre‐ and Post–Sarbanes‐Oxley Periods
resolves10.2307/256871COLLABORATION IN THE BOARDROOM: BEHAVIORAL AND PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF CEO-BOARD SOCIAL TIES.
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedAudit committee industry expertise and financial reporting quality. Working paper
no DOI — not checkedDetecting earnings management
no DOI — not checkedCEO compensation and turnover: the effects of mutually interlocked boards
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedThe accounting causes and legal consequences of non-GAAP reporting: evidence from restatements
no DOI — not checkedThe first stage model estimates the likelihood of the company's own CFO on its board, while the second stage tests the expectation that the likelihood that the turnover of CFOs who serve on the board will be less sensitive to company performance. The second-stage dependent variable CFOCHANGE accepts the value of one if the prior CFO departed. Other variables are defined in Table 2 and are one year lagged. Each regression also includes year and two-digit SIC code industry dummies. Test statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level
no DOI — not checkedref63
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