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Collusive Networks in Market-Sharing Agreements Under the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1593623
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22/22 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

6 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 22 checked references that resolve
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Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
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Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
resolves10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00130.x
Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks*
resolves10.1086/260979
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement
resolves10.1111/j.0020-6598.2004.00292.x
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CRIME DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN FACILITATING DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR*
resolves10.1086/674011
On the Design of Leniency Programs
resolves10.2307/134972
On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership
resolves10.2307/2555490
Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior
resolves10.1006/jeth.1997.2306
Stable Networks
resolves10.2307/2696388
R&D Networks
resolves10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00038-7
Some implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing
resolves10.2307/1593766
Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
resolves10.1111/j.0020-6598.2005.00313.x
OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY*
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.004
Strongly stable networks
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.0108
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
resolves10.2307/2555995
Bid Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution
resolves10.1016/s0167-7187(02)00057-7
Leniency programs and cartel prosecution
resolves10.1257/jel.38.1.45
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
resolves10.2139/ssrn.87248
The Optimal Prudential Deterrence of Price Fixing Agreements
resolves10.1111/j.1530-9134.2012.00352.x
Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
resolves10.3726/978-3-0353-0085-7/1
Contents
The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAre Treble Damages Neutral? Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement
no DOI — not checkedDiscussion Paper TI 93-250, Tinbergen Institute
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedMonopoly and Oligopoly by Merger
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