Reference health

Public Governance of Central Banks: An Approach from New Institutional Economics

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1599418
CiteStamped reference-health badge
33/33 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

25 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 33 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1007/bf00127721
Does there exist a political business cycle: A Box-Tiao analysis
resolves10.2307/2111330
Elections and the Fed: Is There a Political Monetary Cycle?
resolves10.4135/9781446263082
Public Governance
resolves10.3998/mpub.17319
Defusing Democracy
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511754043
New Institutional Economics
resolves10.3998/mpub.13054
The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511510526
Appointing Central Bankers
resolves10.1515/jeeh-1992-0410
CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
resolves10.7551/mitpress/4391.001.0001
The Making of Economic Policy
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511609312
Delegating Powers
resolves10.1086/467037
Separation of Ownership and Control
resolves10.1086/467038
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
resolves10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9_2
Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice
resolves10.1162/003355300555448
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
resolves10.1007/0-387-25092-1_18
The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies
resolves10.2307/1191988
Designing Bureaucratic Accountability
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511571947
The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy
resolves10.1086/scr.1986.3109519
Independent Agencies
resolves10.2307/2110997
The New Economics of Organization
resolves10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.263
Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story--Comment
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511571947.007
The Federal Reserve and its institutional environment: a review
resolves10.2307/2296528
The Political Business Cycle
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511571657.003
The emerging discipline of political economy
resolves10.1016/s1573-5214(08)80028-0
Land lease contracts: properties and the value of bundles of property rights
resolves10.4324/9780429492853
The Economics of Collective Choice
resolves10.1016/0304-3932(82)90013-7
Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System
resolves10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9
Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy
resolves10.2139/ssrn.253803
Why Unitary Boards are Not Best Practice: A Case for Compound Boards
resolves10.2139/ssrn.310501
Why Regulation of Financial Institutions Cannot Be Assured with a Unitary Board
resolves10.1007/bf00124821
The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
resolves10.1086/261181
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511571947.003
Studying the Fed: toward a broader public-choice perspective
resolves10.1093/jleo/15.1.306
Public and private bureaucracies: a transaction cost economics perspectives
The 25 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedLegal Characteristics and Management of the Bank of Japan's Organization in the Light of Public Laws
no DOI — not checkedref7
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedThe Use of Knowledge in Society
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedPublic Choice: The Economics of Politics
no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedPolitical Control and the Power of the Agent
no DOI — not checkedThe Institutional Foundation of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary System
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedThe Governance Structure of Central Banks
no DOI — not checkedToward an Economics of Comparative Political Organization: Examining Ministerial Responsibility
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedThe Competitive Advantages of Compound Boards
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Contracts for Central Bankers
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-28 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1599418"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1599418/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1599418/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.1599418)