Reference health

Financing Experimentation

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1600881
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35/35 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 35 checked references that resolve
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Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
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The Relationship Between Venture Capitalists and Managers in New Firms: Determinants of Contractual Covenants
resolves10.1057/9780230226203.0088
bandit problems
resolves10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00017-x
Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.05.008
A more complete conceptual framework for SME finance
resolves10.2307/2526573
Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(87)90108-6
Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhs068
Real Option Financing Under Asymmetric Information
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb02571.x
Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information
resolves10.2307/1992508
Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements
resolves10.1006/game.1998.0651
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering
resolves10.1002/jid.1032
From microcredit to microfinance: evolution of savings products by MFIs in Bangladesh
resolves10.4159/9780674038547-008
8. Export Dynamics in Colombia: Firm-Level Evidence
resolves10.3386/w17853
The Slow Growth of New Plants: Learning about Demand?
resolves10.1016/s0304-3878(99)00041-3
The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhr071
Real Options Signaling Games with Applications to Corporate Finance
resolves10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00061-2
Lending relationships in Germany – Empirical evidence from survey data
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00557
Internal versus External Financing: An Optimal Contracting Approach*
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq018
CEO Replacement Under Private Information
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01596.x
“Time for a Change”: Loan Conditions and Bank Behavior when Firms Switch Banks
resolves10.1086/375252
Credit Ratings, Collateral, and Loan Characteristics: Implications for Yield*
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00245
Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
resolves10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00009-4
Access to Finance
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhp092
Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts
resolves10.1016/0014-2921(87)90006-7
Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract
resolves10.2307/1911362
The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
resolves10.2307/2555780
Is no News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01688.x
Motivating Innovation
resolves10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.11.008
Competition and microfinance
resolves10.1257/jel.37.4.1569
The Microfinance Promise
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.09.003
Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information
resolves10.2307/2118445
The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships
resolves10.1016/s0167-7187(03)00018-3
Starting small in an unfamiliar environment
resolves10.2307/1911724
Repeated Moral Hazard
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02427.x
Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedContracts as a Barrier to Entry
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedThe Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
no DOI — not checkedScreening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information
no DOI — not checkedA Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedGathering Information before Signing a Contract
no DOI — not checkedref32
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