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Optimal Income Taxation and Public-Goods Provision with Preference and Productivity Shocks

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The 27 checked references that resolve

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A note on optimal income taxation, public goods provision and robust mechanism design

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The Pareto-Frontier in a Simple Mirrleesian Model of Income Taxation

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The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables

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resolves10.1016/j.jet.2008.09.004

On the robustness of laissez-faire

resolves10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01686.x

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