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Equity-Based Incentives, Risk Aversion, and Merger-Related Risk-Taking Behavior

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1616459
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

3 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 38 checked references that resolve
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The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedref40
no DOI — not checkedVEGA = the vega of CEO's stock ownership. RA = the composite measure for the CEO's risk aversion. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. The t-statistics tests whether the mean abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. The F-statistics test whether the abnormal returns are significantly different across firms with low CEO ownership incentives and high CEO ownership incentives
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