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Regulatory Independence and Political Interference: Evidence from EU Mixed-Ownership Utilities’ Investment and Debt

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1627999
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At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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References needing attention

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no DOI — not checkedMassimiliano Mazzanti, Anna Montini and Francesco Nicolli: Waste Generation and Landfill Diversion Dynamics: Decentralised Management and Spatial Effects SD 28.2010 Lucia Ceccato, Valentina Giannini and Carlo Gipponi: A Participatory Approach to Assess the Effectiveness of Responses to Cope with Flood Risk SD 29
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